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PREPARING MULTINATIONAL COMPANIES FOR
TRANSFER PRICING AUDITS OF INTANGIBLES
Thomas C. Pearson1
I. PURPOSE
This article provides guidance for multinational companies
concerned about transfer pricing audits of intangibles, such as
patents2 and trademarks.3 Advice focuses on assisting companies to
prepare for a transfer pricing analysis to avoid potential tax
problems with government auditors. This anticipatory perspective
emphasizes the importance of detailed transfer pricing
documentation. Advisers must understand what is likely to trigger a
transfer pricing audit, particularly for intangibles, and how to
respond to a transfer pricing audit. Encouraging multinational
companies to enter into an Advance Pricing Agreement with
selected governments should help minimize audit problems.
Advisers should view litigation more as a last resort, even though in
the case of intangibles, multinational companies often win at least a
partial victory.

1

Thomas C. Pearson is a Professor of Accounting at the University of Hawaii at
Manoa. He graduated from New York Univeristy (NYU), LL.M. (2005), University of
Denver, LL.M. (1987), Vanderbilt, J.D./M.B.A. (1984). The author is grateful for the
guidance of H. David Rosenbloom, Member of Caplin & Drysdale and Director of the
International Tax Program at NYU, and the insight from his Transfer Pricing course.
The author also appreciates input from Cindy Lin, Gideon Mark, Anand Desai, and
Jessica Kerner.
2
A patent provides various legal rights granted by a government to the patent
owner to protect innovative technology. See, e.g., 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-84(b)(1) (2005).
3
Trademarks exist to identify and protect a company’s goods. See, e.g., 26
C.F.R. § 1.482-84(b)(3) (2005).
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II. INTRODUCTION
Recently, transfer pricing audits4 have occurred more
frequently throughout the world; during the period 2000 to 2003,
nearly half of all parent corporations5 of multinational companies6
underwent a transfer pricing audit somewhere in the world.7 In
addition, three-fourths of multinational companies surveyed
expected a transfer pricing audit during the next few years,8
anticipating even stricter government enforcement.9 The fact that
the U.S. and U.K. are now complaining more about transfer pricing

4

An “audit” is an examination to obtain reasonable assurance to express an
opinion. It typically involves planning, assessing internal controls, collecting evidence,
and reporting the results. Cf. CODIFICATION OF ACCOUNTING STANDARDS AND
PROCEDURES, Statement on Auditing Standards No. 1, § 150.02 (Am. Inst. Of
Certified Pub. Accountants 1972), available at http://www.aicpa.org/download/
members/div/auditstd/AU-00150.PDF (last visited Mar. 16, 2006) (standards of
fieldwork and standards of reporting). Various types of audits exist, such as financial
audits and compliance audits. A “transfer pricing audit” is a type of tax audit that
examines a multinational company’s financial statements and tax reporting
compliance on transfer pricing authority to determine if the company needs to make
adjustments for tax purposes. A multinational company may conduct its own internal
transfer pricing audit, however, more commonly, and as used in this article,
government tax auditors conduct external transfer pricing audits.
5
A parent corporation is often a global holding company, which is not
necessarily located where the multinational company’s major headquarters for
business operations are located.
6
A multinational company consists of corporations or similar multinational
enterprise organizations operating in more than one country. Compare OECD,
TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX
ADMINISTRATIONS, at G-6 (Glossary) (1998) [hereinafter OECD GUIDELINES].
7
See Venessa Houlder, U.S. Revenue Service Gets Tougher on Multinational
Manoeuvers to Avoid Tax, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 3, 2005, at 5.
8
See ERNST & YOUNG, TRANSFER PRICING 2003 GLOBAL SURVEY 7 (2003)
[herinafter GLOBAL SURVEY]. More frequently targeted for tax audits are the
multinational companies from Switzerland, the Netherlands, the U.S., Sweden, and
France. Id. at 11.
9
In fiscal year 2004, IRS enforcement efforts brought in a record $43.1 billion in
enforcement revenue. Mark W. Everson, IRS Commissioner, Enforcement Revenue
Reaches Record in 2004 (prepared remarks)(Nov. 18, 2004). For fiscal year 2006,
President Bush proposed an eight percent increase in enforcement funding while the
IRS as a whole would receive only a four percent increase. See ALLEN KENNEY, IRS
ENFORCEMENT GETS BUDGET BOOST; SERVICE, MODERNIZATION NOT SO LUCKY
(2005), http://services.taxanalysts.com/taxbase/nav.nsf/TNTFrame?Open &Login. The
global economy challenges the IRS to assure the proper assessment and collection of
worldwide income taxable to the United States. I.R.S., THE BUDGET IN BRIEF: FY
2006, 8 (Feb. 2005).
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audits conducted outside their home countries rather than inside
them10 illustrates the expansion of audits and underlines the
importance of proactive preparation.
The increase in transfer pricing audits is itself an indication of
the increasing importance of transfer pricing. In recent years, the
number of transfer pricing audits has dramatically increased in
many countries (e.g., France);11 moreover, some countries have
expanded their transfer pricing focus to include small to mediumsized multinational companies (e.g., Australia).12 In some countries,
transfer pricing audits occurred for the first time in this period (e.g.,
India13 and Colombia).14 Aside from the greater number of audits,
the audits themselves are more aggressive in many countries,15

10
See Competent Authority: Glaxo Case Not Seen Causing Harm to U.S.-U.K.
Competent Authorities’ Relations, 14 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 11 (May
11, 2005). In 2004, multinational companies filed twice as many complaints with the
U.S. competent authority about transfer pricings audits outside the U.S., resulting in
adjustments to the affiliated foreign multinational company, as compared with
complaints about U.S.-initiated transfer pricing adjustment cases. See Competent
Authority: U.S., U.K., Japanese Officials Endorse Binding Arbitration for Unresolved
MAP Cases, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 863 (Dec. 22, 2004) (statement of
Robert Green, IRS, Large and Mid-Size Business Division, Director – International).
11
See, e.g., Gianmarco Monsellato, Transfer Pricing Audits on the Rise, 28 TAX
NOTES INT’L 524 (2002) (“[T]ransfer pricing audits in France increased by 520%
between 2000 and 2002”). See also France Remains Europe’s Toughest Enforcer on
Transfer Pricing Issues, Practitioner Says, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP.
301 (Aug. 4, 2004). But see France Limits Audits to Nine Months for Most Taxpayers,
Gives More Rights, 14 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 55 (May 25, 2005).
12
The Australian Taxation Office outlined its compliance program for 2004 to
2005 to improve transfer pricing compliance with small to medium-size enterprises.
See Paul Riley et al., Australia Steps Up Transfer Pricing Activity, THE ARM’S
LENGTH STANDARD 3 (Feb. 2005) (Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu Ltd., Australia).
13
See Ashish Aggarwal, Transfer Pricing: A New World Order,
BUSINESSWORLD, Dec. 8, 2003, available at http://www.businessworldindia.com/
Dec0803/indepth02. asp.
14
Ricardo Rosero, Colombia’s New Transfer Pricing Rules: A Sophisticated
Approach, 11 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 937 (Mar. 5, 2003).
15
Aggressive enforcement of transfer pricing has occurred in Japan, Australia,
South Korea, and China. See Steven Harris et al., The Path to Resolving Transfer
Pricing Conflict, INT’L TAX REV., available at http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/
?Page=17&ISS=13156&SID=488112 (last visited Jan. 21, 2006). In South Korea,
intense scrutiny and lack of sufficient documentation often resulted in denied
deductions for a significant portion of a multinational company’s management service
fees. See Henry An, Korea’s New Basic Rulings on Transfer Pricing, 13 TAX MGMT.
TRANSFER PRICING REP. 343 (Aug. 4, 2004). However, in 2004 South Korea’s concern
about attracting foreign investment led to modifications to enhance consistency and
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especially during the past few years (e.g., Korea).16 Greater rigor
may be the result of auditors receiving sophisticated international
tax training on transfer pricing audits (e.g., Thailand).17 Growth in
transfer pricing audits and enhanced audit enforcement is expected
to continue in the near future.
Multinational companies can therefore expect a larger number
of audits throughout their organization and should be aware of the
continually evolving nature of audits. Transfer pricing audits in
some countries have switched from an exercise in documentary
compliance to an examination of the substance of the reporting
(e.g., Mexico).18 Elsewhere, the focus may be a combination of
form and substance, which causes auditors to request transfer
pricing documentation at the start of corporate audits (e.g., U.S.).19

predictability. Separate transfer pricing audits will no longer occur if no indication
exists that the taxpayer intentionally manipulated transfer prices. South Korea also
reduced the scope of transfer pricing audits from five to three years. See Korea,
ASPAC TAX NEWSL. (KPMG Int’l, Asia Pac.), Oct. 2004, at 12–14,
http://www.kpmg.or.jp/resources/newsletter/tax/aspac200410_e.pdf.
16
The Korean National Tax Service (NTS) aggressively challenges situations in
which a Korean manufacturing affiliate is converted into a contract manufacturer, a
limited-risk distributor is claimed, or a multinational company uses non-Korean
comparables. See Korea: Officials Challenging Commissionaires, Say Activities
Create PE, Practitioner Says, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 299 (Aug. 4,
2004) (statements of Yoon Hwan Son, Deloitte & Touche’s Seoul office). See
generally Korean National Tax Service’s Basic Rulings for Transfer Pricing (Samil
PricewaterhouseCoopers trans.) (released June 15, 2004, Seoul).
17
Thailand, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 940 Special Report No. 45
(Jan. 19, 2005). As more tax officials in Thailand receive training in Australia,
intangibles are expected to receive more attention. In addition, more valuation issues
will arise when reviewing licensing agreements. Id.
18
See Oscar Campero et al., Mexico Takes New Approach to Transfer Pricing
Audits, 36 TAX NOTES INT’L 861, 861–62 (2002). Although Mexico established a
transfer pricing regime in 1997, it was not until after the Organisation for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) review that it established transfer pricing
standards on intangibles. See Moisès Curiel et al., SAT Publishes New Standards on
the Migration of Intangibles, 5 PRAC. LATIN AM. TAX STRATEGIES 1 (Mar./Apr. 2005)
available at http://www.wtexecutive.com/cms/content.jsp?id=com.tms.cms.section.
Section_1021; see also OECD, PEER REVIEW OF MEXICAN TRANSFER PRICING
LEGISLATION AND PRACTICES ¶ 12 (Mar. 2003), http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/29/16/
34244429.pdf.
19
U.S. international examiners are to issue a written information document request
for a copy of any transfer pricing documentation prepared by the taxpayer pursuant to
section 6662(e) at the joint opening conference for each audit cycle. See Larry Langdon,
Memorandum for LMSB Executives, Managers, and Agents re: Transfer Pricing
Compliance Directive (Jan. 22, 2003), http://ftp.qai.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/transfer_
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Transfer pricing concerns assert increasing influence on tax
treaties. These concerns have triggered revisions, as in the case of
Japan,20 and even termination, as shown by Germany’s 2005
decision to end its bilateral tax treaty with Brazil.21 Because the
application of tax treaties to large companies is vital, governments
ensure consistency by involving their tax-treaty personnel in the
negotiation of large transfer pricing agreements.22
While literature exists on general transfer pricing concerns and
methods, this is the first law review article to provide in-depth
information and advice on transfer pricing audits for intangibles.
Addressing transfer pricing audits of intangibles from a worldwide
perspective is particularly helpful in advising multinational
companies engaged in strategic planning.
Part III of this article will examine preparation for transfer
pricing audits of intangibles and the required analysis and
documentation. Part IV will discuss the problem of transfer pricing
audit triggers and the audit itself. It will also offer suggestions on
how auditors and governments should proceed. Part V will

pricing_compliance_directive_03.pdf. Previously, examiners requested documents in
thirty-five percent of the transfer pricing cases. More recently, they sought documents in
fifty-five percent of the cases. KPMG LLP (U.S.), IRS Targets Transfer Pricing
Compliance, INT’L TAX REV. (Dec. 2004/Jan. 2005), available at http://www.
internationaltaxreview.com/?Page=10&PUBID=35&ISS=12594&SID=470552&TYP
E=20.
20
See Charles Cope & David F. Chan, An Analysis of the New Japan-United
States Income Tax Treaty, 32 TAX NOTES INT’L 1119 (2003) (the revised tax treaty
provides a time limit provided for making transfer pricing adjustments). Transfer
pricing concerns in Japan extend beyond the U.S. treatment of Japanese multinational
companies. For example, Japan imposed transfer pricing adjustments on multinational
corporate group Suzuki in connection with its subsidiaries in South Africa, Colombia,
Hungary, and Indonesia. The Toyota multinational corporate group had a Japanese
assessment based on fees paid to its Singapore marketing subsidiary. See Japan
Expanding Transfer Pricing Probes, 12 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 522 (Oct.
15, 2003).
21
Tax Treaties: Germany Cancels Tax Treaty with Brazil, Gives Transfer
Pricing Disputes as Reason, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 1230 (Apr. 27,
2005) (Germany contended that Brazil’s minimum profit margin requirement for
related party transactions violated the arm’s length principle, distorted risk allocations,
and failed to reflect an open market). Deductibility of royalties and similar expenses in
Brazil is limited to ranges between one and five percent. See Napoleao Dagnese &
Carlos Eduardo Ayi, An Approach to Brazilian Transfer Pricing Practice, 13 TAX
MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 701 (Oct. 27, 2004).
22
I.R.M. 42.10.8.1.5, Negotiation and Approval of Bilateral and Multilateral
APAs (Nov. 15, 1996), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part42/ch10s08.html.
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investigate transfer pricing audits from both an administrative
(focusing on Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs)) and judicial
context (reviewing major cases and illustrating the risks of
litigation).
III. PREPARING THE TRANSFER PRICES OF
INTANGIBLES FOR TAX PURPOSES
In anticipation of audits, companies need a clear and uniform
approach to transfer pricing. To get started in the right direction, an
adviser must meet with the appropriate company officials to
determine the appropriate transfer pricing method23 to use in
establishing the company’s transfer prices. In addition to clarifying
who is responsible for implementing any changes and gathering
necessary information, this discussion should also consider the
potential financial results of this method and the information
needed to provide the best support for these prices.24
A. General Transfer Pricing Analysis and Its Complexities
In a transfer pricing analysis, multinational companies usually
evaluate transactional facts and circumstances.25 The analysis
generally compares the four factors discussed below: (1) functions,
(2) risks, (3) economic conditions,26 and (4) contractual terms.27
The relative importance of these factors depends on the pricing
method used.28 For property or services,29 the analysis should also
determine if any “embedded intangible” exists.30

23

Because transfer pricing methods are widely discussed in current literature, this
article does not discuss them.
24
H. Thomas Davis, Transfer Prices in the Real World—10 Steps Companies
Should Take Before It’s Too Late, 64 CPA J. 82 (Oct. 1994), available at http://www.
nysscpa.org/cpajournal/old/16373972.htm.
25
26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(1) (2005).
26
Relevant economic conditions should consider the similarity of the geographic
markets, the relative size and economic development in each market, whether the market
is wholesale or retail, the market shares for transferred items, relevant location-specific
costs, competition in each market, and the alternatives realistically available to buyer and
seller. 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iv) (2005).
27
26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii) (2005).
28
Companies must conduct an analysis on the functions and risks of the various
parties to the transactions. Governments usually expect companies to acquire
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1. Functions
A “functional analysis”31 helps identify the factors that create
value in the intangible, the identity of the owner, the true nature of
the property transferred, and the terms and conditions under which
a related party uses the intangible.32 A functional analysis also
identifies significant economic activities and the functions of
related and unrelated taxpayers to determine the comparability of
their transactions.33 Nevertheless, a functional analysis is not
usually concerned with unrelated third-party transactions because
each intangible is arguably unique.
In performing the functional analysis, a multinational company
should take into account that government tax auditors will probably
interview the operational personnel most familiar with the
multinational company’s operations,34 as well as the preparers of
the documentation.35 Because the tax department does not deal with
detailed knowledge of products and marketing, the multinational
company’s analysis and documentation preparation should involve
non-tax personnel to ensure accuracy and credibility.

supporting evidence on the comparability of the transaction before selecting the most
appropriate pricing method and setting the actual transfer price.
29
I.R.M. 4.61.3.5.6, Property or Services (Jan. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ch46s03.html.
30
An “embedded intangible” exists if the value of the tangible property or
service is affixed to it, such as a trademark. 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-3(f) (2005).
31
A functional analysis for intangibles looks at marketing and distribution,
advertising, and similar activities. Cf. 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(i)(F) (2005). Other
functions to analyze for intangibles can include research and development, product
design and engineering, and embedded management services. Cf. 26 C.F.R. § 1.4821(d)(3)(i) (2005).
32
See Inland Revenue, Transfer Pricing Guidelines: A Guide to the Application
of Section GD 13 of New Zealand’s Income Tax Act of 1994, 53 ¶ 409 (2000) (New
Zealand), available at http://www.ird.govt.nz/resources/file/ebde89456c78fc0/apx1210.pdf.
33
26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(i) (2005). An example of part of the functional
analysis is identifying royalty rates for trademarks. See Weston Anson, How to Make
Transfer Pricing Work for IP and Intangibles, INT’L TAX REV. (Oct. 2004), available
at
http://www.internationaltaxreview.com/default.asp?page=10&PUBID=35&ISS=
12596&SID=470401.
34
See I.R.M. 4.61.3.5.1, Functional Analysis (Jan. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ch46s03.html.
35
See, e.g., Practitioners Say IRS Digging Deeper in Audits of Pharmaceutical
Companies, 14 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 83 (June 8, 2005).
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2. Risks
A risk analysis evaluates the risks borne by the parties to
controlled and uncontrolled transactions.36 The United States
requires companies to perform a risk analysis within multinational
corporate groups to determine which party in a controlled
transaction bears the associated risks.37 The analysis must also
consider whether income earned by the risk-bearing party is
commensurate with the risks assumed.38
Market risks are the major risks to consider in each step of the
transfer pricing analysis.39 Market risks include fluctuations in cost,
demand, pricing, and inventory levels.40 As part of this risk
analysis, the controlled multinational company’s conduct over time
must remain consistent with the allocation of risks.41 In addition,
the controlled multinational company must have the financial
capacity to absorb the losses that might occur because of the risks
assumed.
3. Economic conditions
One economic factor multinational companies typically take
into consideration in transfer pricing analysis is comparability
adjustments42 for market share.43 Governments generally expect

36
See generally Robert T. Cole, International Strategy for Transfer Pricing
Compliance: A Checklist for Multinationals, in PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. TRANSFER
PRICING, ch. 26 (Robert T. Cole ed., 2d ed. 2001).
37
26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(B) (2005).
38
26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(A) (2005).
39
Another risk arises if the controlled multinational company exercises managerial
or operational control over the business activities that generate the income or loss. 26
C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(B) (2005).
40
Other risks include those related to the success or failure of research and
development activities; financial risks, including fluctuations in foreign currency rates and
interest rates; credit and collections risks; product liability risks; and general business risks
related to the ownership of property, plant, and equipment. 26 C.F.R. § 1.4821(d)(3)(iii)(A) 2005.
41
26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B)(2) (2005); I.R.M. 4.61.3.5.4, Contractual Terms
(Jan. 1, 2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ch46s03.html.
42
For information on potential commercial databases to use in finding
comparables, see Martine Cools, International Commercial Databases for Transfer
Pricing Studies, 6 INT’L TRANSFER PRICING J. 167 (Sept./Oct. 1999); Richard A. Clark,
Finding and Analyzing Comparable Financial Data app. 9C, in TRANSFER PRICING
HANDBOOK (Robert Feinschreiber ed., 1998).
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evidence showing that a market share strategy is likely to produce
future profits commensurate with implementation costs.
Multinational companies can pursue this strategy for only a
reasonably limited amount of time.44
Economic condition analysis also includes two other potential
adjustments based on geographical market and location savings.
Most governments are parochial in preferring transfer pricing
product comparisons within the same geographic market; however,
some governments allow consideration from the same economic
region.45 Location savings arise from operating in a low-cost
geographic location when the cost savings would increase the
profits of comparable firms.46
4. Contractual terms
Comparability for transfer pricing analysis also requires
evaluating significant contractual terms, especially those affecting
prices or profits. Examples of significant contract terms include the
form of consideration; sales or purchase volume; warranties
provided; right to updates; duration, termination, and renegotiation

43
Different market share strategies may exist to enter markets, to increase a
product’s existing market share, or to meet competition, which may affect the price of the
intangibles. 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(4)(i) (2005).
44
26 C.F.R. §§ 1.482-1(d)(4)(i)(A)–(B) (2005). Controlled taxpayers must
document (1) the market share strategy, (2) the related costs and expected returns of
the strategy, and (3) any agreement between the members of the multinational
corporate group to share the related costs before they implement the strategy. 26
C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(4)(i)(C) (2005). Companies must generally include a statement of
the strategy, a detailed marketing plan that addresses resale prices and/or sales
promotion activities, a breakdown of related startup costs, a budget that captures
expected future profits, a time frame to pursue the strategy given the specific industry
and product in question, and written evidence supporting the allocation of risks.
45
See Dirk Van Stappen, Pan-European Versus Country-Specific Searches and
Pan European Versus Country-Specific Databases: Not a Clear-Cut Issue, 13 TAX
MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 222, 225 (July 7, 2004). If the same country
information is not readily available, governments typically allow companies to use
information from an uncontrolled transaction in a different, but similar, geographic market
with appropriate adjustments for market differences. 26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(4)(ii)(A)
(2005).
46
The analysis must consider the competitive positions of buyers and sellers. 26
C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(4)(ii)(C). See generally Diana Jiménez Moncada, Location Savings:
Who Is Entitled to the Additional Profit?, 2005 TAX PLANNING INT’L TRANSFER PRICING
(June 2005).
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rights; collateral transactions, such as for ancillary or subsidiary
services; and extension of credit and payment terms.47 Contractual
terms may vary for each transaction.
5. Other issues
Apart from the four comparative factors explained above, other
issues such as cost sharing arrangements present another set of
problems that companies should consider.48 These problems include
which costs are shared, how these costs are shared, which values
are attributable to the previously developed intangibles, and what
terms are acceptable to the government authorities.49 In many
countries, multinational companies consult with local accountants
to determine what royalty rates are acceptable to the government
tax authorities50 and which royalty rate to use for transfer pricing
tax purposes.51 Whereas domestic firms usually set royalties at a
uniform rate for tax purposes, multinational commercial companies
typically create licenses with tiers of royalty rates based on net
sales.52
Instead of performing a transfer pricing analysis of each
intangible, advisers sometimes recommend bundling each type,
such as a technology licenses. Nevertheless, companies should
prepare to defend an individual intangible that represents a
significant amount of income or expenses, such as more than one
percent of the multinational company’s gross income. Advisers
47

26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(iii)(A) (2005).
See Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.482-7, 67 Fed. Reg. 48,997 (July 29, 2002). The
OECD refers to cost sharing arrangements as “cost contribution agreements.”
49
See MONICA BOOS, INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER PRICING: THE VALUATION OF
INTANGIBLES 140 (2003).
50
Kingsley L. Taft, Joint Development Agreements, Presentation at the
Practicing Law Institute’s Seminar on Patent & High Technology Licensing in New
York City (June 1, 2005).
51
In Italy, royalties under two percent of sales are generally automatically
accepted, while additional technical or legal factors, such as exclusive licensing, may
justify royalties of up to five percent of sales. Royalties exceeding that amount are
justified only in exceptional circumstances, such as licenses for cutting-edge
technology or extraordinary facts. See Marc M. Levey, Italian Transfer Pricing
Revisited: Differences from U.S. Rules Remain, 8 J. INT’L TAX’N 20, 23 (1997).
Similarly, royalties in Vietnam are limited to a maximum of five percent of the net
selling price or twenty-five percent after-tax profit. See Vietnam, 13 TAX MGMT.
TRANSFER PRICING REP. S-26 (Jan. 19, 2005).
52
Author’s discussion with Kingsley L. Taft, supra note 50.
48
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should consider lobbying countries to reward multinational
companies that demonstrate integrity and limit scrutiny to
companies that fail to assure legal compliance.
B. Documentation of Transfer Pricing:
A Necessary Compliance Burden
Conducting a detailed transfer pricing analysis is a costly but
necessary process due to the increased importance of
documentation of transfer prices. Proper documentation is critical
for five major reasons. First, more countries have enacted legal
requirements governing documenting appropriate transfer prices.53
Second, higher transfer pricing penalties may apply if multinational
companies lack proper documentation. Third, multinational
companies generally bear the burden of proof for their tax
positions. Fourth, commercial reasons may exist, such as following
best management practices to assure the efficient use of resources.54
Fifth, documentation helps to reduce retraining costs upon the
inevitable departure of critical people within the company. Proper
documentation also requires that multinational companies take
precautions in drafting the transfer pricing documents for their local
companies to protect the confidentiality of their trade secrets and
commercially sensitive data.55
In general, documentation requirements for tax purposes have
increased worldwide.56 In at least twenty-two countries,
multinational companies must prepare transfer pricing

53

See OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at ch. V, Documentation (1995); I.R.M.
4.61.4.4 Taxpayer’s Books and Records (Jan. 1, 2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/
irm/part4/ch46s04.html; see generally Marc M. Levey & David Balaban, Global
Documentation–Many Considerations, ASIA-PAC. TAX BULL. (Jan./Feb. 2004).
54
See TR 95/D23 (Draft Taxation Ruling), as modified by TR 98/11 (Australia).
55
See, e.g., Parties in GlaxoSmithKline Seek Confidential Information
Protective Order, 106 TAX NOTES 781 (2005); see also Motions: IRS Must Reveal
Number of Allegations of Tax Information Leaks by Japan’s NTA, 13 TAX MGMT.
TRANSFER PRICING REP. 794 (Dec. 8, 2004).
56
Korea is an exception to the trend of increasing document requirements. In
2005, Korea reduced the number of required documents from ten to three (statement
of method of arm’s length price, statement of international transactions, and summary
income statements of foreign-related parties). See Korea, Revised Documentation
Rules by NTA, 17 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. S-79 (Jan. 19, 2005).
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documentation for related company transactions;57 and at least
fourteen
other
countries
recommend
transfer
pricing
documentation.58 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD)59 created guidelines on transfer pricing.
However, the OECD guidelines state, relatively weakly, that “the
information relevant to an individual transfer pricing inquiry
depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case.”60
The transfer pricing documentation burden varies among
countries, in part because the burden depends on the volume and
complexity of documents required by each government. The most
common types of documents governments require from
multinational companies are just for “basic documentation.”
Generally, these include a description of transactions with related
parties, the transfer pricing method selected for the analysis, an
identification of comparables as well as any adjustments to them,
and an explanation of the multinational company’s economic
analysis.61
Some countries further require “moderate documentation,”
which includes an overview of the multinational company’s
business; a description of the multinational corporate group’s
organizational structure and other documents, such as those that
support the assumptions; conclusions; and positions taken in the
multinational company’s transfer pricing documents.62 A few

57
DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, STRATEGY MIX FOR GLOBAL TRANSFER
PRICING: PLANNING FOR METHODS, DOCUMENTATION, PENALTIES AND OTHER ISSUES
18–19 (2006) (Countries requiring documentation are Argentina, Australia, Brazil,
Canada, China, Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, France, Germany, India, Israel, Korea,
Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, South Africa,
Taiwan, the U.K., the U.S., and Venezuela).
58
See id. (Belgium, the Czech Republic, Finland, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, New
Zealand, Norway, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Taiwan, and Thailand).
59
The OECD consists of thirty countries with democratic governments and
market economies. See About OECD, http://www.oecd.org (last visited Mar. 13,
2006).
60
OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 6, ¶ 5.16. A multinational company’s
documentation files should include any cost-sharing or -contribution agreements,
Advance Pricing Agreements (APAs), or rulings from a relevant government. Id.
61
See id. at 22–23, tbl.1 (“Categories of Documentation Required”); OECD
GUIDELINES, supra note 6, ¶ 5.18(iii) (1995) (organizational structure should show
ownership linkages within the multinational corporate group).
62
See DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, supra note 57, at 22–23 (examples of
countries with moderate documentation include China, the Czech Republic, France,
Germany, Italy, Singapore, Spain, and Venezuela). See, e.g., Peter H. Dehnen & Silke
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countries also mandate “extensive documentation,” requiring
written explanations as to why the company did not select
alternative pricing methods, relevant data obtained after year-end,
and/or an index to all the transfer pricing documents.63 Even if it is
a good management strategy to require multinational companies to
prepare an index to relevant documents, advisers should have their
multinational corporate clients lobby to limit the compliance
burden in transfer pricing to “moderate documentation.”
At least fourteen countries require another form of
documentation, referred to as contemporaneous documentation,
where taxpayers contemporaneously document their transfer pricing
analysis.65 Contemporaneous documentation usually means the
local company completes its documentation by the date the parent
multinational company files its income tax return.66 A
contemporaneous documentation requirement reduces discrepancies
in appropriate transfer price that the company can otherwise only
detect with hindsight.67 Contemporaneous documentation should
also include how the multinational company allocates risks among
members of a multinational corporate group.68

Bacht, New Developments Regarding Transfer Pricing Documentation in Germany,
BULL. FOR FISCAL DOCUMENTATION, May 2005, at 185.
63
DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, supra note 57, at 22–23. For example, New
Zealand, Peru, and the U.S. require a documentation index.
65
See DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, supra note 57, at 22–23 (indicating that
countries requiring contemporaneous documentation include Australia, Canada,
China, Germany, Hungary, India, Mexico, the Netherlands, Portugal, South Africa,
Thailand, the U.K., the U.S., and Venezuela).
66
For companies, the cost of contemporaneous documentation can generally
range from US$100,000 to over US$1 million. Gordon C. Millbourn III, Treasury
Inspector General for Tax Administration Report on Transfer Pricing, 12 TAX MGMT.
TRANSFER PRICING REP. 532 (Oct. 15, 2003).
67
To qualify for an exception to the transfer pricing penalties, the multinational
company must have used contemporaneous documentation to record a reasonable effort to
determine its tax liability accurately in accordance with the required transfer pricing
analysis. A failure to provide such documentation to the IRS within thirty days of a
request creates the presumption that the taxpayer did not make the required reasonable
effort. 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-6(d)(2)(iii) (2005).
68
In 2004, Canada issued a directive mandating auditors to request
contemporaneous documentation for non-arms-length transactions with non-residents.
Can. Revenue Agency, Transfer Pricing Memorandum on Contemporaneous
Documentation (Oct. 13 2004), available at http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tax/non
residents/common/trans/tpm05-e.html. The request should occur early in the audit or
when the auditor first becomes aware of the transaction. Id.
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Coordinated “multi-country documentation”69 represents the
efforts of several governments to coordinate the appropriate
transfer pricing documentation when they need to analyze activities
in multiple countries.70 Fewer than one-third of multinational
companies prepare multi-country documentation even though such
documentation might help identify tax-planning opportunities,
provide consistency, mitigate audit risks, and result in
documentation cost savings.71 Legal-language requirements are
often a hindrance to pursuing multi-country documentation;72
however, this documentation practice should significantly increase
when the European Union (E.U.) eventually adopts a coordinated
master-file documentation package for all E.U. countries73 that
permits E.U. countries to require additional local documentation.74

69
Multinational accounting firms have begun to sell services that prepare “multicountry documentation.” For example, PricewaterhouseCoopers refers to its multicountry documentation service as “Global Core Documentation.” See
PricewaterhouseCoopers, Global Core Documentation, http://www.pwc.com/extweb/
service.nsf/docid/178390e968285b8f85256fbf00582caa (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
70
The Pacific Association of Tax Administrators (PATA) Guidance of March
12, 2003, does not impose any legal requirements greater than imposed by the relevant
PATA country (U.S., Canada, Australia, and Japan). Instead, PATA Guidance
attempts to prevent costly duplicative administrative requirements. Pacific Association
of Tax Administrators (PATA) Transfer Pricing Documentation Package,
http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tax/nonresidents/common/trans/pata-e.pdf (last visted Mar.
18, 2006).
71
See GLOBAL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 21. See generally, Gregory J. Ossi et al.,
The Search for Consistency: A Global Approach to Transfer Pricing Documentation,
32 TAX MGMT. INT’L J. 283 (2003).
72
Many countries do not accept transfer pricing documents in a foreign language
(e.g., Greece and Portugal). Some countries will accept documents in English or another
specified foreign language (e.g., Belgium and Spain). Other countries may require
translation at the discretion of the tax administrator (e.g., Finland and Austria). European
Union: Survey Finds EU Members Disagree Widely on Applying Arbitration
Convention Provisions, 12 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 131 (June 23, 2003).
73
In 2006, the E.U. is expected to adopt a proposed EU Transfer Pricing
Documentation policy (where the E.U., not the U.N., must be modified). U.N. JTPF,
21st Sess., 9th mtg., U.N. Doc JTPF/021/2004/EN (Sept. 16, 2004); accord EU
Governing Body to Vote This Fall on EU Forum’s Documentation Proposal, 14 TAX
MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 16 (May 11, 2005).
74
See E.U. Joint Transfer Pricing Forum, Draft Revised Secretariat Discussion
Paper on the Masterfile Concept 10 ex.1, U.N. Doc JTPF/003/REV3/2004/EN (Sept.
16, 2004). The reduced documentation should contain a transfer pricing analysis and
all inter-company agreements. This includes licenses, services, contract research, and
distribution agreements. An international examiner must obtain such agreements,
related correspondence, and records. See I.R.M. 4.61.3.4.6, Transfers of Intangibles
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The quality and reliability of each multinational corporate
group’s transfer pricing documentation varies widely. For example,
the multinational corporate group’s documentation usually leans
toward assisting tax compliance. This practice often weakens the
quality and reliability of transfer pricing documentation. Therefore,
once multinational companies experience transfer pricing audits,
they have an incentive to modify their documentation practices
when they witness the problems created by compromised
documentation. The United States found that most multinational
companies provided satisfactory documentation in 2000–01, with a
trend toward improved compliance.75 In the United States,
Sarbanes-Oxley’s76 new internal control requirements have led to
improved reliability by requiring a demonstration to external
auditors of actual compliance.77 As a result, the auditors’ report on
internal controls has created a “new world” for examining transfer
pricing documentation since 2005.78
Although the quality of documentation produced by “small to
medium enterprises” (SMEs) is often low,79 some governments
have recognized that the standard is nevertheless an excessive
burden—even when the multinational company receives third party

(Jan. 1, 2002), at 9, available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ch46s03.html#
d0e442076.
75
See IRS Dir. of Large and Mid-Size Bus. Div., Fiscal Years 2000-01 I.R.S.
Study: Effectiveness of Internal Revenue Code Section 6662(e) (Dec. 28, 2001)
(response to the request from the U.S. Senate Committee on Appropriations, 106th
Congress, 1st Session).
76
Public Company Accounting Reform and Investor Protection (Sarbanes-Oxley)
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7262 (Supp. 2004).
77
A company must identify its transfer pricing policies and provide external
auditors with evidence of actual compliance with those policies. If the auditor is unable to
recognize and certify compliance with the multinational company’s policies, the U.S.
multinational company may have to postpone filing its annual report with the U.S.
Securities and Exchange Commission. Such an action usually shakes investor confidence
in a multinational corporate group. See Molly Moses, Large Multinationals Taking
Steps to Ensure Pricing Process Meets Requirements of Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
Practitioners Say, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 1091 (Mar. 16, 2005)
[hereinafter Large Multinationals].
78
Clark Chandler, Speaker at NYU in Prof. David Rosenbloom’s Transfer
Pricing Class (Apr. 1, 2005).
79
Grant Thorton, Transfer Pricing, ASIA PACIFIC TAX ADVISER § 2 (Jan. 2005),
available at http://www.gtjapan.com/english/ps/newsletter/0526_apta.pdf.
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assistance in its analysis.80 In 2005, Australia, Canada, and
Denmark each created a simplified approach to documentation for
SMEs.81 In Australia, SMEs must accurately identify and record
cross-border transactions, select an arm’s length method, and test
the method to ensure an arm’s length result. The testing might be as
simple as a basic benchmarking study. The SME must also
implement a review process before completing the required tax
form or schedule for its tax return.82 Other countries should also
limit SME documentation requirements to a basic documentation
standard.
Contemporaneous documentation by multinational companies is
critical throughout the transfer pricing process. Governments need
multinational companies to effectively provide sufficient transfer
pricing documentation to audit companies. Failure to conduct
appropriate analyses or to document transfer pricing policies could
and should result in significant transfer pricing adjustments and
related penalties. These costs should be transparent in either the
company’s financial statements or security filings with a
government’s securities regulator. The documentation requirements
for SMEs, however, should not discourage worldwide business
expansion merely because of expensive transfer pricing studies.
For complex technology licenses, multinational corporations
should expect that more governments will require a clear diagram
of the various licensing arrangements and property rights, and a
summary of the royalty terms. Given that many multinational
companies will engage in extensive cross-licensing and sublicensing, advisers may wish to ensure that tax auditors do not have
to struggle to determine the basic facts about a multinational
company’s assets and liabilities. Otherwise, multinational
companies should expect tax auditors to take a more aggressive
approach in making transfer pricing audit adjustments.

80
The OECD has recognized the need for balance between costs and administrative
burdens. OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 6, ¶ 5.28 (1996).
81
Austl. Tax Office, International Transfer Pricing: A Simplified Approach to
Documentation and Risk Assessment for Small to Medium Businesses (2005) (NAT
12032-03.2005) [hereinafter Simplified Approach]; CRA Info. Cir. 94-4R, APAs for
Small Businesses (Mar. 18, 2005). See Denmark: Parliament Passes Bill Creating
Penalties, Information Document Requirements, 14 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING
REP. 52 (May 25, 2005).
82
See Denmark: Parliament Passes Bill Creating Penalties, Information
Document Requirements, supra note 80.
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IV. EXPERIENCING TRANSFER PRICING AUDITS OF INTANGIBLES
An adviser in a multinational corporate group should perform
periodic spot-checks to ensure that transfer pricing is proceeding
according to plan. New personnel or business problems may have
created changes that the transfer pricing method does not reflect.83
A. Justifiable Audit Triggers and Auditors’ Extensive
Pre-audit Activities
While most multinational companies will usually not disregard
the law, some believe their business strategies may place them
dangerously close to questionable areas that exploit legal
loopholes.84 The natural, but unfortunate, result is that governments
require more detailed transfer pricing audits to ensure that
multinational companies comply with a country’s transfer pricing
legal requirements and the spirit of its law.
Planners should be aware of the range of appropriate transfer
pricing audit triggers scrutinized by various governments.85 For
example, the Canadian Customs and Revenue Agency aggressively
investigates intra-group costs allocated among related entities based
solely on revenues.86 China primarily targets multinational

83

Davis, supra note 24, at 83.
See, e.g., Jim Killaly, Austl. Tax Office, Large Bus. and Int’l, Transfer Pricing
Compliance Issues and Insights in the Context of Global Profit Allocation (Mar. 9,
2000) (unpublished paper presented at the Transnational Crime Conference on file
with author).
85
Audit triggers in Australia include sizeable interest-free loans, inappropriate
payment of royalties, assumption of exchange risk without compensation, and Australian
companies losing assets through restructuring. See Cubby Fox, Taking Aim at Transfer
Pricing, May 2004 (PwC-Australia), http://www.pwc.com/extweb/manissue.nsf/docid/
D165D9792A8536C8CA256CE7000936F5.
86
Other audit triggers in Canada include: 1) inbound management services, priced
at a cost plus mark-up or a royalty basis, 2) outbound management services that are priced
at cost, and 3) product sales to related parties with pricing that differs from the amount
charged to unrelated customers. See Gordon Denusik, CCRA Transfer Pricing Disputes,
Inst. Of Chartered Acct. of B.C. (May 27, 2005), available at http://www.iac.bc.ca
kb.php3?pageid=2328. Canadian business auditors have become increasingly skilled
in identifying transfer pricing issues. The business auditors can refer the case to over
220 specialized transfer pricing auditors in Canada. Ron Holowka, Early Stage
Technology Tax Issues International Transfer Pricing, OTTAWA BUS. J. (May 28,
2004).
84
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companies with sustained losses,87 marginally profitable/loss
making companies, and fluctuating profits.88 In New Zealand, audit
triggers include commissionaire arrangements,89 stock option
recharges or schemes, and regional or head office charges.90
Many countries, including the United Kingdom, have identified
the following transfer pricing audit triggers: complexity of
transactions, significant monetary values, changes in the audited
entity’s taxable income, and the restructuring of multinational
corporate group operations.91 Losses over a number of years are
also of particular concern, according to the U.K.’s HM Revenue &
Customs.92 Another trigger for further audit inquiry in the U.K.
includes any changes in the multinational corporate group’s
arrangements that purport to reduce risk and lead to reduced profits
attributed to the local multinational company.93 Suspicious

87
See, e.g., Shu Wei, New Transfer Pricing Developments in China, DELOITTE
TOUCHE TOHMATSU, July 2004, at 2, http://www.china.ahk.de/gic/biznews/law/
Bulletin_CTN0304E.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2006) (citing China’s Circular No. 70
(Guo Shui Fa No. 70) (June 7, 2004) (regarding transfer pricing enforcement)).
88
For example, a distributor’s loss or substantially reduced profits might arise
because of a fee paid to a related company abroad for the license. See China Tax/
Business News Flash: Who Will Be the Next Transfer Pricing Audit Targets?,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, June 2004, http://www.pwccn.com/home/eng/chinatax_
news_jun2004_tp.html.
89
A commissionaire arrangement allows the commissionaire (often the local
multinational company) to conduct business with the customer in its own name while
the principal (often a related multinational company) maintains all inventory,
operational, and sales risks. At year end, the local multinational company merely
reports a commission based on sales volume for tax purposes. See Challenges to
Popular Tax Structures: Tough Audit Issues for US Multinationals, MORGAN, LEWIS &
BOCKIUS LLP MORGAN LEWIS ON GLOBAL TAX ISSUES, Nov. 2001, at 3,
http://www.morganlewis.com/pubs/040C61CF-01AB-4B7F-A59AFB0FC9902E7B_
Publication.pdf.
90
See GLOBAL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 61 (New Zealand’s Fiscal Authority
Approach).
91
See id. at 11, fig.3.
92
In 2005, the U.K.’s Inland Revenue was consolidated with “HM Customs and
Excise” and renamed “HM Revenue and Customs.” See Commissioners for Revenue
and Customs Act 2005 c. 11 (Apr. 7, 2005). Such continued losses might arise from a
multinational corporate group policy. See, e.g., INTM 461150—Transfer Pricing: Case
Selection—Particular Factors Influencing Case Selection—Losses Over a Number of
Years, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, available at http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk
/manuals/intmanual/INTM461150.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
93
See INTM 461060—Transfer Pricing: Case Selection—The Scope and Degree
of Transfer Pricing Problems, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, available at
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restructuring changes include full service distributors becoming
commissionaires, license manufacturers becoming contract
manufacturers, research and development expertise switching from
a royalty basis to a contract basis, and the addition of cost sharing
arrangements.94
The division of intangibles among a multinational corporate
group is likely an improper transfer pricing tactic and a major
potential audit issue. For example, the payment of significant
management fees or royalties or payment for the use of
intangibles95 are common factors that raise concerns and increase
the chances of audit case selection.96 The U.K. instructs its tax
agents “to review the full facts, use common sense, and exercise
judgment taking into account how a third party would have acted
before reaching any conclusion.”97 Similarly, the acquisition or sale
of intangibles often raises governmental audit inquiries.98
A cross-border reorganization usually triggers a transfer pricing
audit, especially if valuable intangibles exist. For example, in the
United States,99 cross-border reorganizations are not taxable100

http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/INTM461060.htm (last visited
Mar. 18, 2006).
94
UK Inland Revenue Cracks Down on Transfer Pricing Planning, MCDERMOTT
WILL & EMERY NEWSL. (Mar. 17, 2003), http://www.mwe.com/index.cfm/fuse
action/publications.nldetail/object_id/068663cb-9fb9-46af-a8ab-de358a6dec4a.cfm.
95
See, e.g., INTM 461170—Transfer Pricing: Case Selection—Particular
Factors Influencing Case Selection—Charging for the Use of Intellectual Property,
HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, available at http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/manuals/
intmanual/INTM461170.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
96
Questions arising from large management and service fees include whether the
multinational company has a capable management team, whether the fees are large
enough to reduce the company’s profits to negligible amounts, whether the fees are
paid to a company in a tax haven, and whether the fees are new. See INTM 461160—
Transfer Pricing: Case Selection—Particular Factors Influencing Case Selection—
Payment of Significant Management Fees or Royalties, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS,
available at http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/INTM461160.htm
(last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
97
See INTM 464090—Transfer Pricing: Types of Transactions—Intangibles;
Fragmentation, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, available at http://www.inlandrevenue.
gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/INTM464090.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
98
Id.
99
See Jeffrey L. Rubinger et al., Holding Intangibles Offshore May Produce
Tangible U.S. Tax Benefits, 37 TAX NOTES INT’L 907 (2005).
100
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.368-2(b)(1) (2003). See generally Mark A. Silverman
et al., Proposed Regulations Would Permit Cross-Border “A” Reorganizations for the
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except to the extent of transferred intangibles.101 If the transfer is to
a related party, then the U.S. multinational company transferor is
treated as receiving annual payments for the use of the intangibles.
These payments should be commensurate with the income from the
intangibles over their useful lives.102
In addition, tax auditors usually spend an extensive amount of
time examining the facts of a transfer pricing case, especially
before contacting the taxpayer. Tax auditors in the U.K. have
instructions to review information from many sources including
internet searches, multinational corporate group websites, and
commercial databases.103 The auditors must make a risk assessment
about a multinational corporate group’s transfer prices.104
In preparing for a transfer pricing audit, government auditors
should follow three general guidelines. They should (1) use “preaudit techniques,” (2) gain an understanding of taxpayer’s
operations, and (3) review the balance sheets and income
statements.105 Pre-audit techniques entail the review of the

First Time in 70 Years, http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/files/2005-8326-1.pdf
(last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
101
I.R.C. § 367(d) (2005). This provision does not apply to the transfer of
foreign goodwill or going concern value. 26 C.F.R. § 1.367(d)-1T(b) (2005).
102
Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.367(d)-1T(c) (2005). If the transfer is to an unrelated
party, the fictional gain is immediately taxable. Temp Treas. Reg. § 1.367(d)-1T(d)
(2005). For discussion of the international transfer of the PwC trademark name and
associated goodwill and its potential avoidance of I.R.C. § 367(d) (2005), see Lee A.
Sheppard, PwC’s Transfer Pricing Case from Hell, 96 TAX NOTES 327, 331 (2002).
103
Other sources include press reports, trade magazines, the tax agency’s
international library, and other government departments. See INTM 461230—Transfer
Pricing: Case Selection—Risk Assessment: Review of Information from Other
Sources, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, available at http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/
manuals/intmanual/INTM461230.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
104
See, e.g., INTM 461200—Transfer Pricing: Case Selection—Risk
Assessment—Detailed Process, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, available at
http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/manuals/intmanual/INTM461200.htm (last visited
Mar. 3, 2005). The risk assessment should examine six years of financial statements,
the company’s website, its business, the multinational corporate group structure, the
multinational company’s activities as reported in the trade press, comparables
identified in a search of commercial databases, any controlled foreign corporation’s
tax return, and various other items. Id.
105
For a summary of more specific guidance and procedures for large and midsized business examinations, see MICHAEL I. SALTZMAN, I.R.S. PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE ¶ 8.15 (2d ed. 2002).
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multinational company’s tax return,106 particularly the tax return
forms or schedules for reporting related party transactions.107
Auditors in the United States are expected to compute five financial
ratios for the multinational company based on both tax and
financial data.108 They then compare the ratios for the multinational
company to relevant standard industry ratios.109
To obtain an understanding of a multinational company’s
business operations, the U.S. Internal Revenue Manual (IRM)
provides more detailed instructions than similar information
provided in other countries.110 Auditors often seek to understand a
multinational company’s intangibles through a review of U.S. and
foreign patents, trademarks, and prosecution files, together with
research of patent litigation involving the multinational corporate
group and review of copyright registrations.111 To understand the
underlying business, auditors should further inquire whether a
foreign affiliate multinational company has similar intangibles,

106
See I.R.M. 4.61.3.4.1, Preaudit Techniques (Jan. 1, 2002), available at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ch46s03.html#d0e442076 (last visited Mar. 18, 2006)
(citing I.R.S. Forms 5471 (Information Return with Respect to a Foreign Owned
Corporation) and 5472 (Information Return of a Foreign Owned Corporation)). See
also I.R.S. Form 8865, Schedule O (Transfer of Property to a Foreign Partnership)
and Schedule P (Acquisitions, Disposition and Changes of Interests in a Foreign
Partnership); I.R.S. Form 1120, Schedule M-3, revised for 2005, also provides a guide
to auditors of corporate tax returns in reconciling net income with total assets shown
for financial accounting statement purposes.
107
See DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, supra note 57, at 16–17 (tax return
disclosure requirements exist in Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China,
Colombia, Denmark, Ecuador, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the
Netherlands, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, the
U.K., the U.S., and Venezuela).
108
See I.R.M. 4.61.3.4.1 (Jan. 1, 2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/
part4/ch46s03.html#d0e442076. The five ratios are: 1) gross profit to net sales, 2) net
profit to net sales, 3) operating expenses to net sales, 4) gross profit to operating
expenses [Berry ratio], and 5) operating profit to average total sales.
109
Id. For a list of references providing sources for more information on
business comparisons and standard industry ratios, see The Library of Congress
Business Reference Services, A Guide to Finding Business Information at the Library
of Congress (June 20, 2005), http://www.loc.gov/rr/business/guide/guide1/guide1.
html.
110
Documents for the review of international agents include annual reports, SEC
filings (especially Forms 10-K or 20-F), customs entry documents, sales catalogs, and
other relevant documents. Id.
111
I.R.M. 4.61.3.4.2(3), Understanding the Taxpayer’s Operations (Jan. 1,
2002), available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ch46s03.html#d0e442076.
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whether technology transferred between the foreign affiliate
multinational company and the U.S. multinational company,
whether a cost sharing agreement exists, and whether a foreign
affiliate multinational company bought into any cost sharing
agreement.112
In conducting a review of the multinational company’s
financial statements, particularly the balance sheets and income
statements, the U.S. international examiner should obtain product
line income statements from taxpayers engaged in controlled
transactions.113 The auditor will likewise examine the multinational
company’s financial statements over a multiple year period to see if
business cycles or product life cycles provide an explanation.114
The auditor must obtain various internally generated documents to
help perform a functional analysis of the multinational company.115
The auditor also needs information on foreign related entities,
particularly their tax returns and bank records.116 In the outbound
situation, an auditor should understand the relationship with foreign
affiliates in the multinational corporate group.117
Audits often require an increased amount of information from
multinational companies. Recently in the United States, this burden
has arisen partly because the IRS counsel becomes involved prior
to the audit.118 Moreover, document requests have become more

112

Auditors should also inquire who conducted the research and development, the
nature of the research, whether the company used marketing intangibles to develop the
product, who developed the marketing intangibles, and which members of the
multinational corporate group advertised. Id. at (7).
113
I.R.M. 4.61.3.4.3(2), Reviewing Balance Sheets and Income (Jan. 1, 2002),
available at http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ch46s03.html#d0e442076 (last visited Mar.
18, 2006).
114
Id. at 4.61.3.4.3(4).
115
Id. at 4.61.3.4.3(5) (examples of desired information include management
reports, budgets, and audit reports).
116
Id. at 4.61.3.4.3(6).
117
I.R.M. 4.61.3.2(2), Final IRC Section 482 Regulations (Jan. 1, 2002),
available
at
http://www.irs.gov/irm/part4/ch46s03.html#d0e441996.
Desired
knowledge includes a foreign affiliate’s history and background, its formation,
government benefits and incentives provided, its manufacturing facilities, personnel,
products, transfers of intangibles, development of manufacturing intangibles, purchase of
raw materials, and sales of finished products.
118
Before taxpayers forward any documents to the government official, they
should review them to: 1) verify all information is correct, 2) determine if the
information is consistent with the unit’s tax return, and 3) meticulously consider the
effect of the information when given to the government tax auditors. See Howard Kuo,
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formal and the audit includes more depositions of key employees
and third parties.119 If written documents do not support a risk
allocation scheme, auditors will probably ignore them.120 Some
governments (e.g., Canada) will even collect confidential third
party information in transfer pricing audits.121
It is important for multinational corporate group advisers to
understand audit triggers and effectively advise their clients on how
to minimize the probability of a transfer pricing audit and its
related burdens. Understanding the extensive preparation of many
government auditors enables a multinational company to better
prepare for an appropriate response. Multinational companies
should also encourage governments to train their auditors on
transfer pricing issues while preventing overzealous auditors from
harassing multinational companies.
B. Governments’ Transfer Pricing Audits of Intangibles:
Audit Practice and Appropriate Auditor Behavior
Because tax auditor guidance varies significantly from country
to country,122 this section describes several approaches to transfer
pricing audits and highlights certain aspects of the audit process.
Multinational companies operating in Asia are particularly
concerned about transfer pricing audits in China and India.123 In
countries such as China and India, local tax authorities conduct
transfer pricing tax audits based on principles established by the
national government to the extent such principles exist.

Corporate Tax Management for Transfer Pricing Audits, http://www.pwc.com.vn/
extweb/pwcpublications.nsf/4bd5f76b48e282738525662b00739e22/92893e9ce39d6de
6ca256f77000da819/$FILE/Events%20and%20Trends%20Vol.%20171.pdf.
119
Alan Winston Granwell & James E. Brown, Coming Conflicts: Proposed
U.S. Transfer Pricing Services Regulations and the Treatment of Intangibles, IBFD—
DERIVATIVES & FINANCIAL INSTRUMENTS (Sept./Oct. 2004), at 14 [hereinafter Coming
Conflicts].
120
26 C.F.R. § 1.482-1(d)(3)(ii)(B)(2) (2005).
121
See Martin Przysuski, Canada Reaffirms Use of Third-Party Information for
Transfer Pricing Audits, 34 TAX NOTES INT’L 205 (2004).
122
For example, on April 12, 2005, Germany’s Federal Ministry of Finance
issued a seventy-six page document providing extensive administrative principles on
expected transfer pricing documentation. See Christian Ehlermann & Andreas
Kowallik eds., Worldwide: German Tax & Legal News, DELOITTE NEWSL., Apr. 2005.
123
Transfer Pricing Presents Greatest Risk for Companies in Asia, PwC Survey
Says, 14 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 92 (June 8, 2005).
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The transfer pricing audit in China is a two-step process: (1) the
“desk audit” and (2) the field audit at the multinational company’s
premises.124 The field audit occurs only if the desk audit finds
insufficient support from the multinational company’s documents
of the company’s position. Companies in China should receive at
least three days advance notice before a field audit.125
During the field audit, the tax auditors usually question the
Chinese partner in a joint venture about the multinational
company’s related-party transactions.126 The tax auditors also try to
obtain additional documents from the multinational company to
facilitate their investigation.127 If the tax auditors believe that the
Chinese multinational company is losing money through
overpayment to a foreign parent corporation multinational
company, the Chinese multinational company must make a
convincing business case explaining the unique reasons for the
loss.128
Transfer pricing audits occur in India if related party transactions
exceed 50 million rupees (slightly over US$1 million). 129 India’s
local “transfer pricing officer” (TPO) reviews the international
transactions in an “on-desk audit.”130 India’s TPO has the authority
to request documents from the taxpayers’ foreign affiliates.131

124

China, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. S-8 (Jan. 19, 2005).
Id.
126
AM. CHAMBER OF COM. CHINA, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO TRANSFER PRICING IN
CHINA (2005) (information provided by Matthew Mui or Lynn Wang of
PricewaterhouseCoopers’ Beijing office).
127
See Spencer Chong & Rhett Liu, Transfer Pricing Investigation in China,
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS PERSP. (Winter 2001), at 17.
128
For example, if the actual loss is five percent, while other companies in the
industry are making a profit between three to eight percent. The Chinese multinational
company might argue that low capacity utilization cost two percent, manufacturing
defects cost one percent, foreign exchange losses cost two percent, and special start up
costs cost four percent so that in the absence of these extra factors, the multinational
company would have made four percent. AM. CHAMBER OF COM. CHINA, supra note
125.
129
India, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. S-11 (Jan. 19, 2005).
130
Id. The “on-desk audit” is similar to the “office audit” in the United States
where the revenue agent remains at the IRS location in contrast to a field audit where
the revenue agent goes to the taxpayer’s premises.
131
Id. See generally, Samir Gandhi & Rakesh Alshi, Transfer Pricing Audits in
India: The First Year Experience, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 842 (Dec. 8,
2004).
125
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The Australian Tax Office (ATO) also uses a two-step process
for a transfer pricing audit. A “transfer pricing review” precedes
any field audit action. The ATO’s transfer pricing review analyzes
the multinational company’s documentation and interviews
corporate officials.132 In the transfer pricing review, the ATO ranks
the quality of the taxpayer’s transfer pricing process and
documentation on a scale from one to five. A low score increases
the likelihood of a transfer pricing audit.133
Often the guidelines for transfer pricing audits of intangibles
are limited. For example, the U.K.’s HM Revenue and Customs
lists four basic audit issues for intangibles. The revenue agent must
(1) identify any intangibles, (2) determine precisely who owns
them, (3) judge whether they have value at arm’s length, and (4)
acquire expert assistance to pinpoint their value.134 Consequently,
marketing intangibles beyond brand names are always open to
question in the U.K.135
Comparatively speaking, the United States provides the most
detailed and extensive transfer pricing audit instructions. U.S.
international examiners must complete a functional checklist for the
different activities performed.136 Examiners must also obtain expert
assistance in economic analysis, which usually results in a stronger,
more efficiently developed case.137

132

Simplified Approach, supra note 81, at 7.
Id. at 14. Weak documentation also lengthens the probable audit process,
requiring auditors to remain at the taxpayer’s facilities longer and potentially hampering
the multinational company’s daily operations. See GLOBAL SURVEY, supra note 8, at
Brazil’s Fiscal Authority Approach.
134
INTM464070—Transfer Pricing: Types of Transaction: Intangibles: What
are Intangibles?, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, http://www.hmrc.gov.uk/manuals/
intmanual/INTM464070.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
135
Id.
136
I.R.M. § 4.61.3-3, Presentation of Findings (Jan. 1, 2002). Some of the
findings might arise from the auditor’s visit to specific locations, such as the
taxpayer’s marketing office, manufacturing plants, distribution centers and
warehouses, research and development centers, and quality control locations. I.R.M. §
4.61.3(1), On-Site Visitations (Jan. 1, 2002). Auditors conduct such visits to develop a
better understanding of the taxpayer’s marketing and advertising functions, the taxpayer’s
foreign affiliates, the development and exploitation of the intangibles, and the degree of
the parent company’s support. Id. at 3(2).
137
I.R.M. § 4.61.3.3, Economic Assistance (Jan. 1, 2002).
133
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Increasingly, teams of specialists conduct audits, as in China,138
Belgium,139 and Portugal.140 An audit team generally includes an
expert in international tax law, often an attorney or accountant. An
economist selects comparables, determines arm’s length transfer
prices, and values intangibles. A computer audit specialist assists in
analyzing data from the multinational corporate group.141 An audit
team might also have an industry specialist.142
Transfer pricing auditors should propose audit adjustments only
where the multinational company deviated substantially from the
arm’s length method. However, inappropriate audit adjustments
often occur,143 including de minimus transfer pricing audit
adjustments.144 Another type of inappropriate adjustment tactic is
using the threat of an adjustment as a “bargaining chip” that is
negotiated away in exchange for settlements on more meritorious
issues.145 It is likewise inappropriate when auditors require proof
that the local multinational company actually uses the licensed
intangibles,146 or when auditors move straight to proposing a profit

138
See PricewaterhouseCoopers, Revised Transfer Pricing Regulations: More
Strengthened and Centralized Transfer Pricing Enforcement in China (Feb. 2005),
http://www.pwccn.com/home/printeng/tp_cn_circular143_feb2005.html.
139
See Dirk Van Stappen, Belgium’s Transfer Pricing Provision, 14 TAX MGMT.
TRANSFER PRICING REP. 38 (May 11, 2005).
140
See Laurie Wiggins et al., A Portuguese Perspective on Transfer Pricing, 14
TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 33 (May 11, 2005).
141
William E. Bonano, Transfer Pricing Examinations, PILLSBURY WINTHROP &
SUTRO LLP INT’L TAX BULL. (Feb. 1996).
142
In Spain, industry specialists are considered the most qualified to challenge a
taxpayer’s transfer pricing. See GLOBAL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 65. In the U.S., the
transfer pricing audit specialist might come from the “Industry Issue Resolution” program.
See I.R.S. Notice 2000-65, 2000-52 I.R.B. 1.
143
For example, the I.R.S. Appeals Office “sustention rate,” the rate of agreeing
with the revenue agent’s decisions made in Section 482 cases, was only thirty-four
percent in 1998. See I.R.S., REPORT ON THE APPLICATION AND ADMINISTRATION OF
SECTION 482 apps. A-C (Apr. 29,1999), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irspdf/p3218.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2006) [hereinafter REPORT SEC 482].
144
I.R.M. § 4.61.3.1(2), Development of IRC Section 482 Cases (Jan. 1, 2002).
145
Transfer Pricing: Alternative Practical Strategies, 890-1st BNA TAX MGMT.
FOREIGN INCOME PORTFOLIO (2005).
146
See Robert J. Cunningham, The Future of International Transfer Pricing:
Practical and Policy Opportunities Unique to Intellectual Property Foreign Transfer
Pricing Audits of Intangibles, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 697 (2001–02) (this proof
requirement occurs outside of the United States).
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split approach rather than considering the multinational company’s
transfer pricing approach.147
Multinational companies should also prepare for possible
transfer pricing audit negotiations for individual intangibles. A
common audit concern arises when related parties pay royalties to
each other when it is doubtful that the underlying intangibles are
valuable.148 Indirect indicators can help determine an appropriate
share of revenues from the intangible. These indicators include the
significance of the individual intangible within the intangible
basket or technology license, innovation from the intangible, the
age of the intangible, and restrictions on the intangibles.149
Multinational company representatives must be prepared to
articulate persuasively the economic justification for the royalty
amount.
In the United States, multinational companies may request
government audits of specific issues involving factual
determinations or the application of well-settled law to the facts.150
The IRS now offers a joint audit planning process that enables
companies to work with IRS specialists in the transfer pricing audit.
Usually the focus is on procedural issues that can help shorten the
audit cycle and benefit both the multinational company and the
government. These issues include setting appropriate timelines for
information document requests, sharing risk analysis, and reaching
materiality agreements.151 When appropriate, an adviser outside the
United States might also suggest a joint audit planning process

147

See OECD, Contribution Received from PriceWaterhouseCoopers, 2, as part
of Transfer Pricing: The OECD Launches an Invitation to Comment on Comparability
Issues. See also Ken Okawara & Masanori Kawanobe, Japan Announces Results of
Transfer Pricing Audits, 20 TAX NOTES INT’L 245 (2000) (regional tax bureaus have
often used the profit split method arguing there is no reasonable data available to
apply).
148
See INTM 464100—Transfer Pricing: Types of Transaction—Intangibles:
Royalties, HM REVENUE & CUSTOMS, available at http://www.inlandrevenue.gov.uk/
manuals/intmanual/INTM464100.htm (last visited Mar. 18, 2006).
149
Other indicators include the type of competitive market impacting each
intangible, the selling price erosion since the introduction of competitive products to the
market, and the marketing developments for the intangibles. Cf. Contribution Received
from BIAC [Business Industry Advisory Committee to OECD] 4, Transfer Pricing:
The OECD Launches an Invitation to Comment on Comparability Issues, available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/63/2/14554553.pdf (last visited Mar. 11, 2006).
150
Rev. Proc. 2005-12, 2005-2 I.R.B. 311.
151
Coming Conflicts, supra note 119, at 15.
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during which the government will also audit the local multinational
company within a reasonable period.
Although countries may simultaneously conduct international
transfer pricing audits,152 historically, few simultaneous audits have
arisen given the challenges of coordinating each country’s audit
cycles.153 As a result, government tax agencies instead choose to
share company and industry information extensively.154 As standard
auditing processes develop around the world, multinational
companies should also consider sharing more information within
the multinational corporate group about appropriate policies,
responses, and defenses for any transfer pricing audit process.
Worldwide, almost one-third of the transfer pricing audits
generate a penalty.155 Mistakes in financial information or
documentation156 may trigger such adjustments and penalties.157
Thirty-seven countries charge penalties for transfer pricing
abuses,158 and in many of them (such as Mexico,159 Kazakhstan,160

152

See CYM H. LOWELL

ET AL.,

US INT’L TRANSFER PRICING ¶ 11.03[2][e],

(2005).

153

OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 6, ¶ 4.78–4.93. In 1999, the United States had
twelve working arrangements for simultaneous exams with the following countries:
Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Korea, Mexico, Norway, the
Philippines, Sweden, and the U.K. See REPORT SEC 482, supra note 143, at app. A.
154
Further sharing of information among governments is expected with the draft
2005 update to the OECD MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON THE TAXATION OF INCOME AND
CAPITAL (2005), available at http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/54/24/34576874.pdf (last
visited Mar. 18, 2006). For example, article 26(1) represents the change to allow
information sharing when “foreseeably relevant.”
155
See GLOBAL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 16.
156
Vigorous Enforcement Expected in Latin America in 2005, 13 TAX MGMT.
TRANSFER PRICING REP. 759 (2004).
157
Some countries might refer to “interest” as a penalty while other countries
impose a separate interest charge. Interest attempts to recover the real time value of
money. See OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 6, ¶ 4.22. (1995). A penalty system, on the
other hand, attempts to promote compliance. Id. ¶ 4.26. Rather than imposing penalties,
Germany’s approach to the transfer pricing audit adjustment is to set the transfer price
at the high end of the acceptable range.
158
See DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, supra note 57, at 14–15.
159
See Albertina M. Fernandez, Tax Reform Gains Momentum in Latin America,
16 TAX NOTES INT’L 1050 (Apr. 6, 1998) (US$250 million in Mexico).
160
See Kazakhstan: Canadian Oil Concern’s Kazah Subsidiaries Receive $76
Million Assessment for 2002–2003, 14 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 11 (May
11, 2005).
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and Japan161), transfer pricing audits have increased revenues for
their governments.
Some countries have enacted a penalty structure resembling
the U.S. penalty regime for valuation misstatements.162 The U.S.
penalty structure recognizes that transfer pricing is as much an art
as a science; therefore it grants wide latitude in determining
transfer pricing.163 To determine if a penalty applies, governments
typically require that companies report related party transactions on
their income tax return.164 Often, countries provide a narrow
exception to transfer pricing penalties,165 usually based on
reasonableness.166 Multinational companies should lobby
governments to increase the flexibility of transfer pricing penalties.
Reviewing authorities in the government should have the power to

161

See also GLOBAL SURVEY, supra note 8, at 53 (transfer pricing adjustments in
2001 amounted to a total of 85.7 billion yen).
162
For example, Australia imposes a twenty-five percent penalty for other
transfer pricing arrangements having a tax avoidance purpose and a fifty percent
penalty for transfer pricing having the sole purpose of tax avoidance. However, these
penalties receive respective reductions of ten percent or twenty-five percent if the
multinational company has a reasonably arguable position. See TR 98/16, Income Tax:
International Transfer Pricing–Penalty Tax Guidelines (Austl), available at
http://law.ato.gov.au/atolaw/view.htm?docid=TXR/TR9816/NAT/ATO/00001
(last
visited Mar. 11, 2006).
163
In the United States, a twenty percent valuation misstatement penalty applies if
either a transfer price claimed on any tax return is 200% or more (or 50% or less) of the
correct median transfer price determined under section 482 or the net section 482 transfer
price adjustment for a year exceeds US$10 million. I.R.C. § 6664(e)(1)(B) (2005). The
penalty doubles to forty percent in the case of a gross valuation misstatement if either the
price claimed is 400% or more (or 25% or less) of the correct amount or the net section
482 adjustment exceeds US$20 million. I.R.C. § 6664(h) (2005).
164
For instance, the Canada Revenue Agency may use Form T106 as a screening
tool. See Kevin Bell, Response on Tax Form May Trigger Transfer Pricing Audit in
Canada, 34 TAX NOTES INT’L 806 (2004).
165
DELOITTE TOUCHE TOHMATSU, supra note 57, at 16–17 (countries offering a
potential reduction in penalties are Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Colombia, The
Czech Republic, Germany, India, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, the Netherlands, New
Zealand, Peru, Portugal, South Africa, Thailand, the U.K., the U.S., and Venezuela).
166
In Australia, “penalties may be reduced if a taxpayer has a ‘reasonably arguable
position’ in relation to the transfer pricing adjustment.” See Philip Anderson, PATA
Transfer Pricing Documentation Package, ASIA-PAC. TAX BULL. 199, 201 § 4.2.1
(2003) (citing Australian Income Tax Assessment Act 1936 § 222C (1936)). Canada
requires “reasonable efforts to determine and use arm’s length transfer prices.” Canada
Revenue Agency, Canadian Circular 87-2R International Transfer Pricing ¶ 179
(1999). In the U.S., a “reasonable cause” and “good faith” exception exists to the
penalties. 26 U.S.C. § 6664(c) (2000); 26 C.F.R. § 1.6662-5(j)(5)(a) (2005).
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reduce a penalty if they accept a multinational company’s defense
against perceived tax avoidance.
Multinational companies should also seek to reduce
government tax audits by regularly performing internal audits of
their subsidiaries to assess and correct any deficiencies.
Multinational companies need to assess the ethical culture in their
countries of operation to determine the extent to which they can
rely on representations from the local multinational company.167 In
the course of an audit, representatives can encourage diplomacy in
the local affiliate’s response to government tax auditors—and
exemplify it themselves—by asking questions in the context of civil
conversation and limiting criticism to the audit rather than the
auditor.168
Multinational companies sometimes want the “competent
authority” of two governments to agree on a tax issue under audit.
For example, the multinational company may request help from the
“mutual agreement procedure” in a bilateral tax treaty to prevent
double taxation.169 Through this approach, when one country makes
a transfer pricing adjustment, the multinational company receives a
correlative adjustment in the other country.170
As global transfer pricing audits become increasingly
sophisticated, the audit of intangibles requires the transfer pricing
audit team to use commercial judgment and valuation expertise. To
perform this role effectively, multinational companies should
encourage more governments to use professional teams of transfer
pricing auditors with legal, accounting, and economic expertise.

167
Accounting firms have international exchange programs, partly to acquire an
outside perspective on local multinational companies. An exchange helps to determine
who makes the most reliable assessments rather than just presenting information that the
outsider might like to hear. Author’s private discussion with PwC tax partner at the 2005
PwC University for Faculty in New Jersey (June 16, 2004).
168
See generally Margaret Kent & Robert Feinschreiber, Contra-Audit Transfer
Pricing Strategies, 17 TAX NOTES INT’L 1737 (Nov. 30, 1998).
169
For a discussion of proposed changes to the “mutual agreement procedure,”
see Draft OECD Report on Competent Authority Issues, Possible Changes, 13 TAX
MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 423 (2004).
170
The I.R.S. offers a simultaneous Appeals/Competent Authority procedure
under a tax treaty. See Rev Proc. 96-13, 1996-1 C.B. 616. In the United States, a
taxpayer should file protective claims for refund if it expects a correlative adjustment
from a transfer pricing settlement because any correlative adjustment affects the
taxpayer’s income on a year to year basis. See Field Serv. Adv. TL-N-1354-01 (2001).
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Transfer pricing audits are necessary to prevent multinational
companies from engaging in inappropriate tax avoidance; however,
the transfer pricing auditors should give broad leeway to the
multinational company’s careful assessment of transfer prices.
Multinational companies should not hesitate to remind auditors that
their audit approach affects the multinational company’s investment
decisions and the corresponding intellectual property expansion in
the country.
V. RESOLUTION OF TRANSFER PRICING AUDITS ON INTANGIBLES
Because government audit decisions affect company policy,
forward-thinking companies value expeditious resolutions of audit
issues. Sometimes the multinational corporate group or local
company brings in additional outside advisers to help resolve any
transfer pricing issues arising from the audit. However, a better
strategy is to consider resolving probable transfer pricing issues in
advance through agreement with the government, widely known as
an Advance Pricing Agreement.
A. Administrative Resolution, Especially with Advance Pricing
Agreements (APAs)
Constructive resolution of transfer pricing audits usually
requires the government tax authority and the multinational
company to agree on both the facts and a set of applicable transfer
pricing practices.171 Because efficiency is vital, optimal operations
occur when both the multinational company and the government
avoid inflexible positions. They should maintain open and frank
dialogue, consider alternative ways to characterize the transactions,
and remain flexible to resolve any differences.172 A government and
a multinational company usually settle over ninety percent of cases
prior to litigation,173 including transfer pricing audit cases.174

171

See Cym Lowell & Peter L. Briger, Adequacy of International Dispute
Resolution Mechanisms, 10 GEO. MASON L. REV. 725, 733 (2002).
172
Id.
173
Delegation Orders 236-237 cited in SALTZMAN, supra note 105, ¶ 8.15[6][a].
174
Khaled M. Diaw, Ownership Restrictions, Tax Competition and Transfer
Pricing Policy, June 23, 2004, at 2 (according to claims by tax reform advocates at
Senate Committee hearings in 1993).
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Various methods generally exist for settling a tax dispute.
Frequently, an administrative appeals review board within the
government accomplishes settlements.175 Settlements may include
accelerated issue resolution through consideration, mediation, or
arbitration.176 For example, the European Arbitration Convention
has helped settle transfer pricing disputes within the European
Union (E.U.).177 To harmonize governments’ approach to applying
the Arbitration Convention, the E.U. has adopted a “Code of
Conduct on Transfer Pricing.”178 An administrative approach to
settlement is more informal than litigation, which promotes frank
discussion and mutual understanding.179 The favorite type of
175

Usually, an administrative appeals board does not publish their decisions.
However, an exception exists in India. In a multinational corporate group case
involving a French parent company and an Indian subsidiary that produced medical
instruments, the Indian tax authority held that an interest-free loan was subject to
transfer pricing coverage. See A.A.R. No. 609 (2003), Indian Advance Ruling
Authority Decision on Applying Transfer Pricing Laws (New Delhi) (Nov. 24, 2004),
reprinted in 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 967 (Feb. 2, 2005), cited in India:
Ruling Board Says Transfer Pricing Laws Apply Even if Compliance Lowers Tax
Liability, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 958 (Feb. 2, 2005). The Indian
multinational company failed with its valid argument. The Indian Ruling Board held
that the nondiscrimination provision of the Finland-India tax treaty could still apply
transfer pricing concerns that did not apply to domestic related party transactions.
Arguably, the ruling may have been necessary to increase the compliance for transfer
pricing in India.
176
See I.R.M. 35.3.20, Mediation (Jan. 24, 1996); I.R.M. 35.3.20.1 Preliminary
Considerations (Jan. 24, 1996). See also, ROBERT T. COLE, Arbitration of Transfer
Pricing Disputes Under Tax Court Rule 124, in PRACTICAL GUIDE TO U.S. TRANSFER
PRICING 23.15 (2d ed. 2001). The U.S. Senate Finance Committee is expected to
recommend arbitration when the IRS misses meeting case management timelines or
when negotiations with foreign governments becomes unprincipled or inconsistent.
See Finance Committee Draft Report Suggests JCT Review, Looking to ‘Bottom Line’
in APAs, 14 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 154 (June 22, 2005).
177
Convention on the Elimination of Double Taxation in Connection with the
Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises, July 23, 1990, 90/463/EEC, 1990
O.J. 225/10 (L 225) (EC). [hereinafter European Arbitration Convention]. See
generally Gianmarco Monellato, France and Italy Settle First Case under Arbitration
Convention, TAX PLANNING INT’L TRANSFER PRICING (July 2003) (regarding “profit
allocation between a manufacturer and a distributor”).
178
The E.U.’s Council of Finance Ministers adopted the Code. Proposal for a
code of conduct on transfer pricing documentation for associated enterprises in the
E.U. COM (2005) 0543 final (Nov. 7, 2005), available at http://europa.eu.int/eurlex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:52005PC0543:EN:HTML. See also
Company Taxation: Commission Proposes Code of Conduct to Eliminate Double
Taxation in Cross-Border Transfer Pricing Cases IP/04/542 (Apr. 27, 2004).
179
I.R.M. 8.6.1.2, Appeals Conferences (Feb. 18, 1999).
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settlement in the United States is the “Mutual Concession
Settlement” in which neither party concedes the underlying issue.180
If the relative values of the issues in an all-or-nothing situation are
similar, parties may trade issues to reach a “Split Issue
Settlement.”181
A company may also enter into an Advance Pricing Agreement
(APA) with a government to preempt disputes by securing preclearance on the multinational company’s transfer pricing. The
APA determines the appropriate transfer pricing method,
comparables, adjustments, and critical assumptions for the APA’s
future duration.182 APAs for intangibles usually cover a “bundle of
commercial property that when combined, form an entire business
system.”183 In theory the APA represents a voluntary, binding
contract between a government and a multinational company,184
usually made after extensive pre-filing discussions185 (A
government’s APA team186 must conduct due diligence to establish
that the facts submitted by the multinational company are complete
and accurate.187). In reality, however, governments sometimes force

180

I.R.M. 8.6.1.3.1, Mutual Concession Settlements (Feb. 18, 2003).
I.R.M. 8.6.1.3.2, Split Issue Settlements (Dec. 15, 2004) (settlements of
penalty issues must be based on the merits and hazards of litigation surrounding each
penalty).
182
OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 6, at G-1 (Glossary) (1996). See, e.g., Robert
Weissler, Memorandum for APA Economists, in ADVANCE PRICING AGREEMENT
PROGRAM TRAINING MANUALS, reprinted in 10 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP.
(July 5, 2000).
183
Austl. Tax Office, Advance Pricing Arrangement Program: Report of
Developments in 2003-04 (Oct. 2004) [NAT 12082], available at
http://www.ato.gov.au/print.asp?doc=/content/50911.htm. This bundle of intangibles
can encompass “knowledge/know-how, business and IT systems, processes and
procedures, specifications, trademarks, trade names and branding. Some elements may
be protected by trademark and copyright and others by confidentiality agreements.” Id.
184
Id. at ann. 2004-26.
185
See, e.g., Ernst & Young, New Developments in Dutch APA/ATR Practice,
Apr. 23, 2003. The Dutch planned to formalize pre-filing meetings to discuss facts and
different options prior to the multinational company filing of the APA request. Id.
186
The APA team is similar to an audit team. A team leader coordinates contact
with the multinational company. Team members are usually comprised of an
international examiner, an economist, a lawyer, and perhaps other specialists
(industry, tax treaty, or appeals officer). See I.R.S. Ann. 2004-26, 2004-15 I.R.B. 743
(Apr. 12, 2004) (5th Annual APA Report in the U.S.).
187
See id. at ann. 2004-26.
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companies into APAs.188 Another frustration is that not all
companies seeking an APA or its renewal are accepted.189
Despite some shortcomings, APAs offer a number of
advantages to companies.190 Notably, many companies primarily
enter into an APA to acquire tax certainty rather than tax savings.191
Tax certainty is often essential to effectively implement other
international tax planning strategies.192 With an APA, the
multinational company should have certainty for the APA’s
duration, usually about five years.193 An APA can also substantially
reduce the probability of costly transfer pricing audits and
litigation.194

188
See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores, Inc, Before the I.R.S., APA Public Hearing (Feb.
22, 2005) (statement of Wyman Atwell), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsapa/wal-mart_stores_-_wyman_atwell.pdf (last visited Mar. 18, 2006). About one-third
of U.S. companies entered into an APA during an audit. Sean Foley, Principal KPMG,
Comments at NYU Prof. H. David Rosenbloom’s Transfer Pricing Class (Apr. 8,
2005).
189
Canada has discontinued APAs with about thirteen percent of companies. The
companies sometimes withdrew from the APA program or had their applications
revoked by the Canadian authorities. Global Transfer Pricing Update, 31 TAX NOTES
INT’L 327 (July 28, 2003).
190
See e.g., Austl. Tax Office, Introduction to Concepts and Risk Assessment
(Apr. 2005), at 3 [NAT 2725], available at http://www.ato.gov.au/
taxprofessionals/content.asp?doc=/content/35283.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2006)
(explaining that benefits include reducing the possibility of double taxation, reducing
record keeping burdens, and reducing business costs).
191
See Kevin A. Bell, U.S. Senate Panel to Review APA Program, 33 TAX
NOTES INT’L 232, 232 (2004) (quoting Chris Faiferlick of Ernst & Young).
192
Judith P. Zelisko on behalf of Tax Executives Institute, The I.R.S.’ Advance
Pricing Agreement Program, IRS Hearing, Feb. 22, 2005 [hereinafter IRS hearings].
In addition, some taxpayers view APAs as having restrained potential transfer pricing
excesses of several countries. See Henry J. Birnkrant & Robert T. Cole, Remarks of
Henry J. Birnkrant & Robert T. Cole, of Alston & Bird LLP on Advance Pricing
Agreements, IRS Hearing, Feb. 22, 2006, available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irsapa/alston_and_bird_-_henry_birnkrant _ and_robert_cole.pdf.
193
Slightly more than half of the APAs had five year terms and one-third had a
term longer than five years. I.R.S. Ann. 2005-27 (Mar. 31, 2005).
194
See, e.g., Advance Pricing Agreements: Costco Resolves Dispute with
Canada, U.S. Over Royalty Due U.S. Parent for 1996-2006, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER
PRICING REP. 1093 (Mar. 16, 2005). The Costco APA covered intangibles, including
know-how and trademarks. The SEC Form 8-K filing said net income was positively
impacted by a one-time US$52 million income tax benefit resulting primarily from
settlement of a transfer pricing dispute between the United States and Canada. Id.
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APAs may be unilateral, bilateral, or multilateral.195 A
unilateral APA is the most common type196 and only involves the
multinational company and the government.197 A multinational
company might prefer a unilateral APA when there is a concern
that the request for an APA in another country might trigger an
audit there.198
A bilateral APA is an increasingly popular solution199 that
involves two governments negotiating to create a uniform standard
that each will apply to the multinational corporate group.200
Governments sometimes prefer bilateral APAs201 because they can
have persuasive effect beyond the countries involved and influence
government policies in third countries.202
In a multilateral APA, several countries jointly define how a
multinational corporate group should set its transfer prices in those

195
The IRS released updated guidance on APAs in Rev. Proc. 2004-40, 2004-29
I.R.B. 1. For APA procedures in China, see China’s Circular No. 118 (Guo Shui Fa No.
118) (Sept. 3, 2004). For APA procedures in other countries, see BNA, Transfer Pricing
European Rules and Practices (France, U.K., and Germany), 895 TAX MGMT.; BNA,
Transfer Pricing: Foreign Rules and Practices Outside of Europe, Part I (Canada,
Mexico, and Japan), 897 TAX MGMT.; and BNA, Transfer Pricing: Foreign Rules and
Practices Outside of Europe, Part II (Korea, Australia, and Brazil), 898 TAX MGMT.
196
See Steven S. Saeger et al., Comment on PATA Guidance for Bilateral APAs,
ITPJ (Jan./Feb. 2005), at 3–6.
197
See, e.g., Landwell & Associates [trans.], French Finance Ministry’s
Unilateral APA Guidelines, 14 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 191 (July 6, 2005)
(reporting Administrative Reg. A4 A-11-05, issued June 24, 2005).
198
Sean Foley, Principal KPMG, Comments at NYU Transfer Pricing Class
(Apr. 8, 2005).
199
See, e.g., Dutch Ministry Handling More A.P.A. Requests, Processing Fewer
Unilateral, ‘Other’ Requests, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 1100 (Mar. 16,
2005).
200
For example, in 2003–04, Australia completed eight bilateral APAs involving
Canada, the U.S., Japan, the Netherlands, and New Zealand. ATO, APA REPORT
(NAT 12082-10.2004) (fig. 2 and accompanying text). In 2005, China and Japan
entered into China’s first bilateral APA. China’s First Bilateral APA Concluded, 2005
TAX PLANNING INT’L TRANSFER PRICING.
201
See, e.g., U.K. TRANSFER PRICING GROUP, ERNST & YOUNG, U.K. TRANSFER
PRICING GROUP, TRANSFER PRICING IN THE U.K. 15 (2004). Bilateral APA negotiations
effectively resolve concerns about acquiring potential correlative adjustments by the
other government tax authority. The multinational company seeking the APA
contributes behind the scene to the discussion and negotiation between the relevant tax
authorities of the two countries.
202
Prof. H. David Rosenbloom, Comments at NYU Transfer Pricing Class (Apr.
8, 2005).
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countries.203 A multilateral APA is most appropriate where a
corporation conducts global trading or has become a globally
integrated business.204 Multilateral APAs are a recent
development205 and are still rare.206 However, multilateral APAs
should increase dramatically, especially once the E.U. establishes
coordinated transfer pricing procedures.
The United States207 and Australia created the first APAs in
1991.208 At least twenty-four other countries have since formally
adopted them.209 The APA procedures among countries are

203

See, e.g., Germany: Germany Aims to Streamline APA Process by Allowing
Direct Negotiations with Berlin, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 57 (Sept. 29,
2004).
204
For example, the first European multilateral APA was for Airbus, a leading
European aircraft manufacturer. See Laurence Delorme et al., Airbus APA: Using
Multilateral Agreements to Solve Complex Transfer Pricing Issues, 13 TAX MGMT.
TRANSFER PRICING REP. 276 (July 21, 2004) (The multilateral APA was between
France, Germany, Spain, and the U.K.).
205
OECD GUIDELINES, supra note 6, Annex: Guidelines for Conducting APAs
under the Mutual Agreement Procedure, at AN-28 (1999). The first two multilateral
European APAs were signed in 2004. See APAs Are Set to Take Off in Europe, 2004
INT’L TAX REV. 37 (June 2004) [KPMG, available at kpmgbe.lcc.ch].
206
Several countries have engaged in multilateral APAs. France has engaged in
three multilateral APAs, all with E.U. countries. Michael Collet, Int’l Tax Inst. (3rd
Annual) at Fordham Univ. (June 2, 2005) (paper and statement). As of the end of
2004, the United States has engaged in eight multilateral APAs. Rev. Proc. 2005-27,
I.R.B. 2005-16 (Apr. 18, 2005). Japan has engaged in at least four multilateral APAs.
Caplin & Drysdale, International Tax: Negotiating Advance Pricing Agreements,
available at http://www.capdale.com/practices/areadescriptions.asp?ID=50 (last
visited Mar. 21, 2006).
207
The success of APAs in the United States arose in part because the U.S. APA
Office is separate from the field office that conducts audits. This changes the
dynamics for negotiation. Sean Foley, Principal KPMG, Comments at NYU Transfer
Pricing Class (Apr. 8, 2005). The productivity of economists in evaluating cases
illustrates the difference. The APA economists complete about one case per month
while the transfer pricing audit economists complete one case every three months.
208
See Simon Phillipson, Australia Enters Multilateral Advance Pricing
Agreement, 2 J. INT’L TAX’N 116 (1991).
209
Besides the United States and Australia, before 2001 APAs were authorized
in Brazil (1997), Canada (1994), France (1999), Germany (2000), Japan (1987), Korea
(1996), the Netherlands (1999), New Zealand (1994), and the U.K. (1999). See
Japan’s Second Annual APA Report, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 587
(2004). Other countries authorizing APAs in more recent years include Belgium,
China, Colombia, Hungary, Israel, Italy, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Peru, Portugal,
Singapore, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, and Venezuela. See DELOITTE TOUCHE
TOHMATSU, supra note 57, at 28–29. Additionally, Austria, Indonesia, the
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substantially similar, but they have some procedural differences.210
Parties do not generally publish APAs, unless the multinational
company publishes them pursuant to litigation.211 However, public
documents sometimes reveal basic information on APAs. 212 The
United States was the first to introduce an annual government
report on APAs.213 Other countries who now issue an annual APA
Report include Australia, Canada, and Belgium.214 The APA
Reports are informative, particularly in categorizing the actual
approaches used in transfer pricing cases settled through an APA.215
Due to these benefits, the demand for APAs should increase. In
the United States, strict compliance with the Sarbanes-Oxley Act is
expected to motivate more multinational companies to enter into or
renew APAs,216 and once companies have obtained APAs, they
usually desire to renew them. Some taxpayers with APAs would

Netherlands, Sweden, and Switzerland have engaged in APAs. ERNST & YOUNG,
TRANSFER PRICING GLOBAL REFERENCE GUIDE 8, 33, 41, 55, 56 (May 2005).
210
See, e.g., Steven C. Wrappe et al., Side-By-Side Comparison of the APA
Procedures: The United States and Australia, 38 TAX NOTES INT’L 821 (2005); Steven
C. Wrappe et al., Side-By-Side Comparison of the APA Procedures: The United States
and France, 37 TAX NOTES INT’L 1195 (2005); Steven C. Wrappe et al., Side-By-Side
Comparison of the APA Procedures: The United States and Japan, 37 TAX NOTES
INT’L 401 (2005). For an example of the development of the APA program, see Bruno
Gibert, Consolidating and Developing the French Advance Pricing Agreement
Procedure, EUR. TAX’N (Feb. 2005).
211
An APA published in litigation is insightful for showing amounts allocated to
intangibles for a pharmaceutical multinational company: twenty-eight percent of net
trade sales as marketing commissions, five percent of net trade sales for the trademark,
and three percent of net trade sales for the trade name. IRS APA for Dyazide, Tagamet,
13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 922, app. A (Jan. 19, 2005).
212
See, e.g., Advance Pricing Agreements: Costco Resolves Dispute with
Canada, U.S. Over Royalty Due U.S. Parent for 1996-2006, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER
PRICING REP. 1093 (Mar. 16, 2005) The Costco APA covered intangibles, including
know-how and trademarks. Costco’s SEC Form 8-K filing said net income was
positively impacted by a one-time US$52 million income tax benefit resulting
primarily from settlement of a transfer pricing dispute between the United States and
Canada. See Costco Wholesale Corp., Form 8-K (May 26, 2005).
213
See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2004-26, 2004-15 I.R.B. 743.
214
See Second Decade of APAs: Greater Transparency, 11 TAX MGMT.
TRANSFER PRICING REP. S-3 (Mar. 5, 2003).
215
For example, in Canada a large number of APAs use a profit-split method when
quality comparable transactions are not available. Canada Revenue Agency, APA
Program Report 2003–2004 14, http://www.cra-arc.gc.ca/tax/nonresidents/business/
apa_report04-e.html (last visited Feb. 24, 2005).
216
Large Multinationals, supra note 77, at 1093.
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like the United States to enter into “synthetic bilateral APAs” with
countries like Argentina and Brazil that do not have tax treaties
with the United States.217 The APA process is not without its
critics—it takes an average of over two years in the U.S.218—and
some allege the APA process is broken.219 In 2005, the U.S. Senate
reviewed the U.S. APA program and will probably recommend that
the IRS harmonize the system by placing a dollar figure on the
transactions covered by each APA.220
APAs have great promise, but the system needs further
refinements. Simplified procedures may encourage more small to
medium-sized businesses to participate in an APA program.221
Governments must continue to invest more resources in the APA
process for both hiring personnel and training APA teams. In
addition, APA teams need greater expertise in order to develop
industry specializations in complex areas where multinational
companies seek integration across countries.222
Companies should consider obtaining APAs. They are not
panaceas; however, to resolve transfer pricing audits
administratively, it is essential that the multinational corporate
group have credibility with the relevant governments. APAs are
only part of the process; the corporate group establishes credibility
primarily through the sum of its actions, which consists of the
quality of its transfer pricing documentation and its responsiveness
to government inquiries.
217

See John Mitchell, Vice-President, Eaton Corp, IRS APA Hearings, Feb. 1,
2005, available at http://apps.irs.gov/pub/irs-apa/eaton.pdf.
218
Similarly, taxpayers sometimes complain that APA renewal is more time
consuming than needed. See, e.g., Daniel Karen & Pat Breslin, IRS APA Hearing
Urges Fairness (and Funding) Over Consistency, 6 TAX NEWS AND DEV. 13 (Feb.
2005).
219
Peter Blessing, Int’l Tax Inst. (3rd Annual) at Fordham Univ. (June 3, 2005)
(moderator of the New U.S.-Int’l Env.: Gov. Roundtable)
220
See Lee Sheppard, Draft Senate Finance APA Report Shows Incompetent
IRS, 2005 TAX NOTES TODAY 119-1 (June 22, 2005).
221
See Notice 98-65, 1998-2 CB 803 (special APA procedures for small
business in the U.S.); cf. Deloitte, French Tax Administration Announces Measures to
Improve APA Program, THE ARM’S LENGTH STANDARD, 2 (Feb. 2005).
222
The United States will create specialized APA teams in five areas
(automotive, financial products, pharmaceuticals, semiconductors, and cost sharing).
These five areas have consumed fifty-six percent of the total case time during the past
two years. See Molly Moses, Practitioners Hail Changes to APA Program Designed
to Speed Cases, Increase Accountability, 14 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 3
(May 11, 2005).
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B. Litigation is a Risky Solution

In most countries, little or no transfer pricing case law exists,223
especially regarding intangibles.224 Even though companies who
litigate over intangibles usually achieve partial success, litigation is
risky for multinational companies. There is a lack of litigation
partly because litigation on complex tax cases often takes over five
years from the first year at issue.225 Given that rigorous worldwide
transfer pricing regulation has only occurred within the last decade,
more cases are likely to arise in the future. 226 For instance,
multinational companies operating in Canada are increasingly
turning to Canadian courts.227 Another possible reason for lack of
case law on these issues may derive from the fact that governments
usually litigate only those cases presenting broad compliance
issues.
Internationally, most transfer pricing case law has failed to
provide a relatively predictable rationale for the court’s
decisions.228 In Russian courts, the government’s transfer pricing
arguments have continuously failed in court because the tax
authorities lack either essential expertise, resources, or economic
data to establish a market rate.229 Transfer pricing in Russia has

223

See Transfer Pricing Cases Around the World, 12 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER
PRICING REP. 970 (Mar. 3, 2004).
224
Transfer pricing cases on intangibles have arisen in Belgium (No.
1997/FR/33) and Germany (6 K 1910/98). Id. In 2001, Korea’s first transfer pricing
case involved royalties paid to the U.S. parent. See Youngjin Jung, First Korean Case
on Transfer Pricing Comparability: Dubious Conclusions, Statistical Errors, J. INT’L
TAX’N (2004).
225
See, e.g., Transfer Pricing Cases Filed in Argentina; First Lawsuit Expected
Soon in Mexico, 12 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 737 (2004).
226
Litigation: First Half of 2004 Shows Eightfold Increase in Allocations: Cases
Filed Double from 2003, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 253 (Jul. 21, 2004).
227
See Molly Moses, As Negotiations Falter, U.S. Competent Authority ‘Not
Discouraging’ Litigation in Canadian Courts, 10 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP.
559 (Sept. 29, 2004). However, no Canadian cases have addressed inter-company
transfer of intangibles. See Nathan Boidman, Canada, Transfer Pricing: Foreign
Rules and Practice Outside of Europe, 897-1st BNA TAX MGMT. PORTFOLIO (in the
text after note 105).
228
Eduardo Baistrocchi, The Arm’s Length Standard in the 21st Century: A
Proposal for Both Developed and Developing Countries, TAX NOTES INT’L 241, 255
(Oct. 18, 2004).
229
See Dmitry Rybko and Biaino Kutanina, Russia Paying Close Attention to
Transfer Pricing Rules, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 885 (Dec. 22, 2004).
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acquired considerable attention because of a US$11 billion suit
between two companies within the Yukos multinational corporate
group.230
Since the United States has the most extensive litigation history
regarding transfer pricing issues, U.S. case law occasionally
influences other countries.231 U.S. cases on intangibles have
focused predominantly on the high-value intangibles and patents,
trademarks, and their licensing; and the U.S. government has lost
most of these transfer pricing cases.232 This may be due to the
complexity of transfer pricing cases, which seem to overwhelm the
tax court.233 However, U.S. case law mostly consists of applying the
ancient 1968 transfer pricing regulations. When the courts start to
apply the more sophisticated 1994 or subsequent regulations, a
different result may occur.
Those who engage in transfer pricing litigation over intangibles
should be aware of some significant taxpayer victories. In the U.S.
Tax Court Sundstrand case,234 the intangible was a license for
manufacturing an aircraft engine part. The court upheld the
multinational company’s licensing agreement using evidence of

See also Russia: Significant Amendments Proposed, Tax Planning Int’l Trans. Pricing
11 (June 2005).
230
Court to Proceed on $11 Billion Lawsuit Against Yukos for Abusive Transfer
Pricing, 13 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 1231 (Apr. 27, 2005).
231
See, e.g., Diahatsu Australia Pty Ltd v. FCT [2001] FC 588 (Australia). See
also, John George Azzi, Challenging an Australian Transfer Pricing Determination in
Light of the Daihatsu Decision and the Hickman Principle, 31 TAX NOTES INT’L 159,
170–71 (2003).
232
The U.S. government was actually successful in litigating Medieval
Attractions, N.V., v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.M. 924 (1996). The government’s success
was probably because the case involved a tax haven. A multinational company paid
franchise fees of restaurant and entertainment services to a related Netherlands
Antilles entity (tax haven multinational company). This tax haven company in turn
paid guarantee fees to Spanish investors. The U.S. Tax Court denied the deduction for
the payments to the foreign affiliates because the U.S. multinational company
developed the intangibles. The payments lacked “economic substance” and were
undertaken solely for tax avoidance purposes. Id.
233
This complexity was expressly noted in Perkin-Elmer Corp. v.
Commissioner, 66 T.C.M. (CCH) 634 (1993). This case involved licenses with a
nonexclusive right to use and sell equipment, as well as an exclusive right to
manufacture it in Puerto Rico. Because the IRS changed its reason for the assessment
before trial, the U.S. Tax Court concluded the IRS’s reallocation was arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable. Id. at part III (9598).
234
Sundstrand v. Comm’r, 96 T.C. 226 (1991).
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similar intangibles to third parties. Sundstrand’s Singapore affiliate
was successful in using location savings to justify higher than
normal profits. In another case involving the license of a U.S.
company’s pharmaceutical drug patents to a Puerto Rican
subsidiary in a section 351 tax-free incorporation,235 the courts
found that at least part of the IRS’ assessment was arbitrary,
capricious, or unreasonable.236
Courts have even rejected the arguments of both governments
and multinational companies, especially when a court finds that the
parties’ analysis is incomplete.237 As illustrated in H Group
Holding,238 a court typically uses its “best judgment” to reach its
own conclusion. The issue in H Group Holding was Hyatt hotel
chain’s trade name, trademark, and management services for its
reservation system and corporate overhead. Hyatt claimed that its
brand names were not a significant factor in the hotel industry. The
IRS applied the residual profit-split method to reallocate a royalty
to the parent company Hyatt. Consequently, the U.S. Tax Court
created a royalty rate of 1.5% for the foreign subsidiaries’ use of
the Hyatt management services and a rate of 0.4% for the trademark
and trade name.239

235

Governments also sometimes audit pharmaceutical companies for their use of
research and development (R&D) tax benefits. In the U.S., R&D is either deducted
under I.R.C. section 171 or serves as a “tax credit” (dollar for dollar reduction) under
I.R.C. section 41. See generally, IRS, Pharmaceutical Industry Research Credit Audit
Guidelines (Mar. 30, 2004), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/
2004pharrd.pdf.
236
Defining the tax avoidance problem too narrowly as property transferred to a
Puerto Rico possessions corporation, Congress added I.R.C. section 936(h) for
intangibles transferred to a possessions corporation under a non-recognition section,
such as section 351. See G.D. Searle & Co. v. Commissioner, 88 T.C. 252 (1987). See
also Eli Lilly & Co. v. Comm’r, 84 T.C. 996, 1131 (1985), aff’d on this issue, rev’d in
part, 856 F.2d 855 (7th Cir. 1988) (Companies have the burden for showing that the
government’s allocation was arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable.); Merck & Co. v.
Comm’r, 24 T.C. 73, 91 (1991). See generally ROBERT T. COLE, PRACTICAL GUIDE TO
U.S. TRANSFER PRICING 24.03[A] (2d ed. 2001).
237
See, e.g., Seagate Technology v. Comm’r, 102 T.C. 149, 163 (1994) (The
court constructed a royalty rate for the technology and know-how for hard disk drives
using licensing agreements of similar patents).
238
H Group Holding, Inc. v. Commissioner, T.C.M. (CCH) 334 (1999).
239
Hyatt and the IRS subsequently settled the case in more detail. See
Settlements: Hyatt Group Resolves §482 Issues for Service, Royalty Fees From
Affiliates, 12 TAX MGMT. TRANSFER PRICING REP. 123 (2003).
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VI. CONCLUSION
The worldwide growth of transfer pricing concerns makes it
more essential that corporate advisers of multinational companies
understand transfer pricing audit triggers, audit processes, and
methods to resolve significant tax disputes. A multinational
company adviser ought to communicate with various executives in
a multinational company about preparing for a transfer pricing
audit to understand what is likely to happen during an audit and to
resolve it satisfactorily.
Increasingly, multinational companies must perform substantial
functional, risk, contractual, and economic analyses throughout
their worldwide operations. At the same time, government tax
auditors ought to increase the sophistication in their APA teams in
order to audit multinational companies and their transferred
intangibles more fairly.
Contemporaneous documentation throughout the multinational
company is critical in this whole process. Failure to conduct
appropriate analyses or to document transfer pricing policies could
and should result in significant transfer pricing adjustments and
related penalties. These costs should be transparent in either the
company’s financial statements or security filings with a
government’s securities regulator. However, documentation
requirements for small companies should not require excessively
expensive transfer pricing studies that discourage worldwide
business expansion.
Advisers should encourage multinational companies to consider
entering into some type of APA with at least one government.
Litigation is a risky approach for a multinational company even
though the multinational company with an intangible at issue in a
transfer pricing audit will usually achieve partial success. While
there have been relatively few transfer pricing cases focusing on
intangibles outside the United States, more are expected soon.
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